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“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary
giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the
new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you
of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome
among us. You have no sovereignty where we
gather.”
-

John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace”1

Introduction
The widespread proliferation of information and communications technologies
(ICT) over the past few decades has undoubtedly had profound impacts on innumerable
facets of human life. The transformative effects that ICT use has had on social relations,
international business, and global politics are in themselves remarkable, yet the speed
with which they have occurred is at least equally impressive. Indeed, the so called
“Internet revolution” has lived up to its moniker in so many ways that some leading
media scholars argue that “immersion in the digital world is now or soon to be a
requirement for successful participation in society.”2 Whether this modern requisite is
ultimately for the better or worse, and if the associated changes have brought about more
positive or negative effects, are subjects of much ongoing debate. Still, an overwhelming
number of academics, politicians, and pundits believe modern ICT to be universally
beneficial and staunchly advocate for accelerated global connectivity via the widespread
adoption of such tools.
At the same time, a quieter and less publicized debate is emerging concerning
who should direct the evolution of cyberspace (the notional environment created by
1

John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” 8 February 1996,
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (accessed 23 February 2012).
2
John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, “The Internet‟s Unholy Marriage to Capitalism,”
Monthly Review (March 2011): 1.
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interconnected and interdependent ICT infrastructures, telecommunications networks,
and computer processing systems) and who should govern the various activities that take
place within. The explosion of e-commerce, cyber crime, and most recently the use of
ICT in political and social movements, make this debate ever more pertinent. As such,
countless actors from the private sector, governing agencies, and civil society have joined
this conversation, each developing and advancing their own preferred plans for the future
of ICT growth and governance. This thesis is a contribution to this ongoing discussion.
While ICT includes a broad array of telecommunications systems, computers,
hardware, software, etc, much of my analysis will be concerned with the Internet, as it
constitutes what is arguably the greatest area of contention within the broader debate.
Likewise, while this topic is of global import, this thesis will focus primarily on the US
government‟s approach to international ICT governance (the US State Department‟s
involvement with the subject in particular) and the role of US based ICT companies in
promoting the adoption of ICT across the globe. The decision to narrow the focus was
made for sake of brevity but also because of the US‟s prominent role in global cyberrelated matters. Beyond the typical clout it enjoys as the sole remaining superpower, the
US has enormous influence over how global debates concerning cyber-issues unfold due
to its position as the Internet‟s (and many ICT‟s) place of origin. Furthermore, the model
of cyber infrastructure and governance that the US employs domestically and advances
abroad is the most complete illustration of the “integration of monopoly-finance capital
and the Internet, representing the dominant tendency of the global capitalist system.”3
With such immense global influence over the issues of concern, the US is the ideal
analytical focal point.
3

Foster and McChesney 2011, 1.
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In the coming chapters, I will critically assess the US‟s “International Strategy
for Cyberspace,” its policies concerning Internet freedom, and its corollary promotion of
global connectivity via ICT. I will argue that the Internet freedom discourse constitutes a
form of epistemic violence that the US government and its like-minded allies perpetrate
against those who adhere to contradictory communication policies. I will further suggest
that the associated policy initiatives render the US culpable, if not wholly responsible, for
the physical violence that people may fall victim to as a result of using the technology it
actively helps develop and promote. I also contend that the US‟s attempt to establish the
guiding norms and govern the behavior in “cyberspace” is an example of “international
governmentality,” a contemporary variant of Michel Foucault‟s notion concerning
modern power relations. Following this, I will demonstrate how Foucault‟s understanding
of governmentality reveals important aspects of the US-led cyber agenda that remain
hidden in the rhetoric; aspects which allow for a more complete assessment of the policy
and its implications.

Chapter Overview
In chapter one, I will define what I call the “Connectivity Doctrine;” a term meant
to serve as shorthand for the (primarily) U.S.-led efforts to promote the proliferation of
ICT use across the world and the global adoption of particular infrastructure models, as
well as its desire to direct the evolution of cyberspace. The term also includes the
argumentation, rhetoric, and relevant policies concerning “Internet freedom,” ICT
development, and international cyber-governance. I will then include a discourse analysis
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of the Connectivity Doctrine‟s major speeches and policies concerning the Internet in
order to contextualize the parameters of the leading positions.
In the second chapter, I will critically analyze the Connectivity Doctrine in an
effort to reveal its underlying purposes as well as the potential implications, effects, and
consequences it may have that are not explicitly articulated in the rhetoric. I will draw
parallels between past and present variations of the “techno-optimism” discourse,
situating the Connectivity Doctrine as a modern manifestation of a time-honored
hegemonic strategy to maintain and expand power. I will argue that the same logic,
rhetoric and methodology that was used by past hegemonic powers to justify imperialism
in the 15th-20th centuries is being used today to justify the contemporary, virtual
“colonization” of cyberspace.
Once the Connectivity Doctrine has been defined, dissected, and contextualized, I
will shift the focus of my thesis to theory. I will present Michel Foucault‟s study of
neoliberal governmentality as a theoretical framework which can be used to explain what,
how and why specific actors advance certain organizational designs and policy
recommendations concerning how the Internet should evolve and how it ought to be
governed. I will provide a brief, but necessary overview of Foucault‟s theory in chapter
three, followed by two chapters in which I apply governmentality theory to the
Connectivity Doctrine to illustrate its broad implications. Finally, I will conclude my
thesis by arguing that the Connectivity Doctrine is part of a larger project of neo-liberal
globalization; a project that has historically fostered the overthrow of governments,
military invasions, and otherwise represents a form of subjugation disguised as

7

benevolence that can lead to various forms of state violence and ultimately, modern
Empire.
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Chapter I: The Connectivity Doctrine4
The use of the Internet, social networking sites, mobile devices, and other ICT in
recent social and political movements has reinvigorated a long-established spirit of
“techno-utopianism” that had seemingly been dormant since the “dot-com bubble” burst
in the 1990s. Such optimism has been a historically reoccurring trend that tends to
emerge whenever new technology is developed, especially technology that has the
potential to transform both the market and social spheres. It is important to note that the
promise of new technology is almost always predicated on economic and material
improvements first; the potential social benefits (efficient global communication, greater
access to knowledge, the strengthening civil society by fostering democratic debate, etc.)
are typically addressed later, as the discourse evolves. While both rationales are
important, the economic impact must be great enough to influence market behavior as
well as policy makers before the potential social benefits are integrated into the rhetoric.
In the present case, ICT has opened up countless new markets and has thus gained
the interest of both capital and political nodes of power. Many contemporary cyberoptimists,5 in turn, have hypothesized about the potential social benefits modern ICT may
have and believe that global connectivity via ICT represents the solution to many of the
world‟s problems. To cite just a few examples, cyber-optimists argue that ICT
(particularly the Internet) has brought about a new wave of citizen journalism; that it
4

The term, “Connectivity Doctrine,” is my expanded take on what Evgeny Morozov calls the “Google
Doctrine.” While the terms are similar in that both refer to the “enthusiastic belief in the liberating power
of technology” (Morozov 2011, xiii), the “Google Doctrine” focuses primarily on US governmental
partnerships with Silicon Valley on foreign policy matters. The “Connectivity Doctrine” takes this as a
point of departure and expands it to include the US-led effort to shape the Internet‟s architecture globally
and establish behavioral and governmental norms in cyberspace. The term also borrows from Julian
Reid‟s outstanding analysis of the “biopolitics of information technology” and the subjectification of “the
Connected” and “the Disconnected” as new categories of human beings (Reid 2009).
5
This term and its variants refer to the virtually messianic belief in the “emancipatory nature” of ICT
coupled with a “stubborn refusal to acknowledge its downsides.” (Morozov 2011).
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fosters a new sense of collective identity and community among users;6 and that it will
provide people with unprecedented resources, information and power. They point to the
reduced costs of democratic participation, ease of communication, increased access to
information, and expedited social mobilization as examples of how ICT have been used
to promote political engagement. Furthermore, cyber-enthusiasts contend that modern
ICT made possible novel modes of activism such as cyber disobedience, virtual protest,
and hacktivism,7 which are better suited for contemporary social and political
movements. As such, those subscribing to these beliefs advocate for the proliferation of
ICT to increase global connectivity, arguing that doing so will help quell existing power
imbalances and decrease inequality across the globe. Like-minded politicians and policy
makers in turn adopt this line of argumentation and include ICT in development plans
and international aid packages. Taken together, the academic research, the political
rhetoric, and the promotion of specific policies comprise the theoretical basis and driving
force of the Connectivity Doctrine.
Still, the Connectivity Doctrine is more than a collection of position papers and
policies. While these are important components that help illustrate its principles, the
Doctrine is fundamentally a philosophical view that guides the pertinent research and
informs the related policies. Similar to the “Bush Doctrine” 8 and the “Monroe

6

Saeid Golkar, “Liberation or Suppression Technologies? The Internet, the Green Movement and the
Regime in Iran,” International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society vol. 9, no.1 (2011): 51.
7
Ibid., 52.
8
The “Bush Doctrine” is a phrase used by politicians and pundits to describe the guiding ideology and
policies of the George W. Bush Administration that were initially outlined by President Bush in his
speeches following the attacks on September 11, 2001 and later developed throughout his term in office.
Never presented as an official or comprehensive document, the Bush Doctrine was a set of principles that
informed policy decisions; core among them, the right to subject any state or organization that it deemed
a potential threat to the United States to the “full range of instruments of power,” including economic,
diplomatic, and military means (most notably the right to wage unilateral and pre-emptive war).
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Doctrine,”9 the Connectivity Doctrine is not a formal document or official policy ratified
by congressional legislation, but is instead a phrase that refers to various principles and
ideologies that help shape foreign and domestic policy. It is strongly influenced by cyberutopianism in that it is a “quasi-religious belief in the power of the Internet to do
supernatural things.”10 As we will explore further, such a techno-centric approach to
foreign policy often replaces more effectual political action in a way similar to how the
Bush Doctrine‟s emphasis on unilateralism often left no room for more traditional
diplomacy and compromise.
The Connectivity Doctrine is similar to other Western-engineered development
plans in both its initiation and deployment. Setting aside the potential merits of the
arguments, the agenda, like most modern development plans, assumes a market-based
understanding of improvement and progress, one that demands infinite growth potential
and is assessed primarily by quantitative measurements. Also similar to other modern
development plans, it is experts and academics from NGOs, think tanks, and academia
who establish boundaries, define units of measurement and assessment, and generate
models for achieving “progress” and “success.” Likewise, politicians and policy makers
translate these action plans into official policy and then try to convince the broader public

Chambers Dictionary of World History, 2005, s.v. “Bush Doctrine,”
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy1.lib.depaul.edu/entry/chambdictwh/bush_doctrine (accessed 23
February 2012). Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, 2002, s.v. “Bush Doctrine,”
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy1.lib.depaul.edu/entry/abcintrel/bush_doctrine_2001 (accessed
23 February 2012).
9
Likewise, the Monroe Doctrine, which expressed the US‟s neutrality in European Affairs and condemned
all future acts of European colonialism in the Americas, was never ratified by congress, but rather existed
as a set of principles and beliefs that guided official policy and decision making. First expressed by
President Monroe in a speech to congress, the Doctrine evolved over time in response to US foreign
policy priorities. The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2008, s.v. “Monroe Doctrine,”
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy1.lib.depaul.edu/entry/columency/monroe_doctrine (accessed 23
February 2012).
10
Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs,
2011), 19.
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of their worth. The rhetoric used often presents these policies as politically neutral and
uncontroversial, and as specific terminology gets repeated and policies approved, ideas
and discourses become normalized and gradually gain widespread public acceptance. In
this way, “idea producers” and governmental agents work together to manufacture
“universal knowledge.”
The United States has a pronounced interest in expanding global connectivity as
well as shaping the governing architecture of cyberspace. As the base of many of the
largest technology companies, the US economy stands to gain tremendously from
increased sales of its products and services abroad. The US government also has a
strategic interest in global connectivity, as its evolution has immeasurable implications
for national security, international relations, military engagements, and countless other
arenas. Thus, understandably, the US private and public sectors each try to take
advantage of the techno-optimism discourse and promulgate the assertion that modern
ICT use serves as the best and most efficient path toward global economic development
and societal progress.
Beyond increasing sales of US based ICT products and services, the Unites States
government further seeks to establish and institutionalize guiding principles and norms of
behavior to govern cyberspace. To advance this goal, it positions itself as the natural
leader in shaping, codifying, and administering Internet governance. The US argues that
as the birthplace of many ICT and the home of many of the preeminent experts on the
subject, it is uniquely qualified for this role. In the International arena, the US has been
successful in influencing the evolution of cyber-governance largely by exercising the
aforementioned strategy of creating “universal knowledge” through directing the terms
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and conditions of relevant discussions. It strategically situates global connectivity and
“Internet freedom” as part of broader human rights and development discourses; a clever
political maneuver that makes the issues appear politically and value neutral. As we will
see, this is not always the case. While arguing that it is simply advancing universal rights
and norms, the “Connectivity Doctrine” implicitly privileges Western, neo-liberal
conceptions and ideologies concerning property rights, freedom, governance, economics,
and world view.
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1.1 The Connectivity Doctrine as Articulated in
US State Department Speeches
The Obama administration has been clear since taking office that cyberspace is
central to its foreign policy. Among other things, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has
given several highly publicized speeches concerning the United States‟ Internet freedom
agenda; the State Department‟s “NetFreedom Taskforce” has been notably active; and in
May of 2011, the White House released the official “International Strategy for
Cyberspace,” the first of it kind.11 Despite these speeches and documents, the term
“Internet freedom” remains rather ambiguous; likewise, what its promotion entails and
what the benefits and costs associated with this endeavor might include remain unclear.
Still, careful analysis of the relevant speeches and policy documents helps clarify some of
these ambiguities.
In January 2010, just days after Google announced it would no longer comply
with the Chinese government‟s demand for the company to censor web searches in the
country, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech to a group of politicians,
NGO representatives, and leaders from the telecommunications industry that laid out the
Obama administration‟s Internet freedom policy.12 In February of the following year, just
days after the Egyptian government shut down the entire country‟s access to the Internet
in response to growing demonstrations, Secretary Clinton made another speech, titled
“Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World, that further
11

In the introduction to the document, President Obama writes: “this is the first time that our nation has laid
out an approach that unifies our engagement with international partners on the full range of cyber issues.”
Executive Office of the President and the National Security Council (U.S.). “International Strategy for
Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World.” May 2011.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf
(accessed 29 April 2012).
12
Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” Speech, The Newseum, Washington D.C., 21 January
2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm, (accessed 2 April 2011).
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articulated the US‟s position and policy. Beyond simply advocating for an open internet
that allows for free speech and fosters democratic dialogue, the text of these speeches (as
well as the strategic timing of their delivery) offers insight into how communication
technology can help advance the US‟s broader ideological, technological, political,
economic and geo-strategic goals. To help unpack these ideas, I will first provide a brief
overview of the US‟s position on Internet freedom, as defined in Clinton‟s speeches.
Following this, I will review the US‟ International Strategy for Cyberspace in an effort to
further clarify the US‟ position and related policy. In subsequent chapters, I will dissect
some of the deeper implications this policy may have concerning foreign intervention,
surveillance, and violence.
Without using the words explicitly, Clinton begins both of her speeches by
framing the issue of Internet freedom as one of “good” vs. “evil.” She warns that
communication and information technologies can just as easily be used to foster
economic progress and social justice as they can to undermine them. As such, she argues
that it is essential for the US to promote network designs and policies that advance
liberal-democratic values while at the same time increasing the number of people who
have access to the Internet.13
Clinton acknowledges that the Internet‟s architecture can be constructed in
numerous ways; ranging from a severely restricted Internet, such as the Chinese model,
where governments have the authority to monitor and censor the content that individual
users view, to a radically free and lawless model, akin to what the Internet‟s originators
had in mind, and everything in between. Clinton recognizes that the world‟s information
13

Clinton 2010, 2. (Note: the transcripts of Clinton‟s speeches are not numbered. For ease of reference, any
page numbers listed in footnotes are my own, based on a copy of the transcript printed directly from the
cited url)
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infrastructure being built today will have profound and long-lasting effects on global
power configurations of the future. This being the case, she contends that the United
States‟ design can “deliver the greatest possible benefits to the world”14 and should thus
serve as the model for other countries to emulate. Further arguing the supremacy of the
American model, Clinton charges that countries with alternative Internet policies,15 such
as those with aggressive surveillance and censorship practices, are “taking the wrong
path” and that their misguided approach will ultimately fail.16
Still, an Internet that simply reflects liberal-democratic values by embracing
Western interpretations of free speech and market-driven content production and
dissemination, yet remains fragmented along national borders in terms of access and
governance is not adequate, according to Clinton. Reaching further, she states that the
ideal network architecture would be a singular, global Internet that is accessible to “all of
humanity.”17 Defending this point, she argues that this particular version of the Internet
can serve as both “the great equalizer” and “the on-ramp to modernity,”18 as it allows for
the expedited exchange of information and enable capital to spread to new markets more
efficiently.
Secretary Clinton also explains how the US has committed diplomatic, financial,
and technological resources to promote its preferred form of the Internet and the liberaldemocratic values embedded within. The US has used various diplomatic channels to

14

Hillary Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World,” Speech,
George Washington University, Washington D.C., 15 February 2011,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm, 2, (accessed 2 April 2011).
15
Clinton is specifically referring to governments that restrict citizen access to the Internet in the name of
security or public morality.
16
Clinton 2011, “Internet Rights and Wrongs,” 4.
17
Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” Speech, The Newseum, Washington D.C., 21 January
2010, 3, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (accessed 2 April 2011).
18
Clinton, 2010, 5.

16

help associate Internet freedom with human rights on a global level, including placing the
issue on the agenda of the United Nations Human Rights Council.19 Financially, the State
Department provides funding for individuals, companies and institutions that develop
global information and communications technologies that “advance [their] diplomatic
and development objective.”20 And technologically, the US helps create and deploy
software that enable foreign citizens to circumvent their home government‟s censorship
and surveillance practices and provides training on how to use them.21
Clinton infuses Western interpretations of human rights, modernity, and progress
in her rhetoric to justify the US‟s Internet policy. Of these, she spends the most time
arguing that that Internet freedom should be regarded as a basic human right. Clinton
contends that certain individual rights (now among them the right to have unfettered
access to information and communicate via a free and open Internet) are universal and
calls for a global commitment to protect these rights. Her references to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights‟ inclusion of the right to exchange information seems to
support international agreement on these issues, yet she also refers to a particularly
American experience with and understanding of rights. For instance, Clinton argues that
the right to speech should never be restricted, yet concedes that this freedom has
limitations, such as restrictions on libel and slander as well as provisions to protect
intellectual property. Highlighting the distinctly American, liberal interpreation of free
speech for which she advocates, Clinton notes that she disagrees with legal restrictions on
hate speech, presumably including many European countries‟ laws against holocaust

19

Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 8.
21
Ibid., 7.
20
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denial.22 Clinton further contends that governmental processes should be made
transparent, but maintains that governments have the final say in what information is
appropriate for public consumption and what should remain confidential.23
Beyond the human rights frame, Clinton furthers her claim that the US model
works to the benefit of all by highlighting its ability to stimulate economic growth and
foster liberal democratic principles. In this way, the US‟s Internet policy is promoted as
an act of benevolence; the diplomatic efforts, financial investments, and acts of
technological intervention are all aimed at “improving the lives” of the global population
and providing the “foundation for global progress.”24 Calling the Internet “the great
equalizer,” she argues that modern communication networks can help integrate more
people into the global market economy and will “create new opportunities where none
exist.”25 Clinton then makes an allusion to the primacy of Western enlightenment
philosophy as she argues that the US‟s efforts will also promote greater respect for
diverse views and help strengthen democratic principles. She asserts that access to
information and reasoned discourse alone can nullify intolerance and offensive speech;
by merely exposing different ideas to debate, she contends, “those with merit [will be]
strengthened, while weak and false ideas [will] fade away.”26
Finally, Clinton argues that the US has a responsibility to shape the architecture of
a single, global Internet and establish international “norms of behavior” concerning the

22

Clinton 2011, 6.
Clinton uses WikiLeaks as an example here, arguing that the ensuing debate over government
confidentiality was a “false debate” because the U.S. could “neither provide for our citizens‟ security nor
promote the cause of human rights and democracy around the world if we had to make public every step
of our efforts” (Clinton 2011, 5).
24
Clinton 2010, 9.
25
Ibid., 5.
26
Ibid., 6.
23
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“global networked commons.”27 She traces this responsibility back to the nation‟s
founding commitment to the free exchange of ideas,28 yet more recent factors are also
pertinent. Clinton maintains that because it is the birthplace of many communication
technologies, the United States has a responsibility to ensure that they are used for good.
To do this, the US must synchronize “technological progress with [its] principles”29 by
using diplomatic mechanisms to establish guiding rules and norms for communication
networks, by providing funding to promote connectivity, and through technological
intervention, technological or otherwise, when necessary.

1.2 The United States’ “International Strategy for Cyberspace”
In May 2011, the Obama Administration released the US‟ first ever
comprehensive agenda concerning global ICT titled: [The] International Strategy for
Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World. This document is
the clearest articulation of the Connectivity Doctrine to date, and alongside Secretary
Clinton‟s speeches, serves as its ideological basis. As such, these texts will serve as the
anchor around which I will situate my analysis.
Released several months after she initially introduced the US‟s position on cyber
issues, the International Strategy for Cyberspace reinforces the principles Secretary
Clinton had outlined previously in her speeches. The Strategy maintains the three main
priorities of economic prosperity, security, and the promotion of universal rights, and
uses these to justify its strategic approach. It also expands on the US‟s role in directing

27

Ibid.
Ibid., 3.
29
Ibid.
28
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the future shape of cyberspace and its governance structures. In a highlighted section of
the document, the policy‟s overarching goal is clearly articulated:30

“The United States will work internationally to promote an open,
interoperable, secure, and reliable information and communications
infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, strengthens
international security, and fosters free expression and innovation. To
achieve that goal, we will build and sustain an environment in which
norms of responsible behavior

guide states‟ actions, sustain

partnerships, and support the rule of law in cyberspace.”31

For present purposes, it should be noted that the economic objective is listed first,
followed by security, with free expression coming last. Furthermore, while this
highlighted section suggests that the US will “work internationally,” the second sentence
states matter-of-factly, “…we will build” [with we referring to the US and perhaps likeminded states] an environment in which norms of responsible behavior guide state
actions. Also intriguing is that establishing and formalizing “norms of responsible
behavior” is not only stated explicitly, but is actually written in bold typeface to
emphasize the importance of this particular goal.
What constitutes responsible behavioral norms, and who defines them as such,
reveals an extremely important power dynamic that lies at the core of the Connectivity
30
31

Worthy of note, this section is literally highlighted in the document with the subtitle, “Our Goal.”
Executive Office of the President and the National Security Council (U.S.), “International Strategy for
Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World.” May 2011, 8,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf
(accessed 29 April 2012) (emphasis is from the document).
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Doctrine, yet is often hidden in the rhetoric. Assuming responsibility over the
construction of the cyber-environment, the US becomes the de facto party that determines
what constitutes said “responsible” norms of behavior; however, the strategy document
does state that the US will work with “like minded states” to establish these norms.32 In
its explicit pronouncement of this role, the document extends the model of hegemonic
power demonstrated in other US foreign policy strategies to the cyber realm. Such bold
declarations concerning global leadership roles perpetuates the implicit belief in the
supremacy and global applicability of Western norms and values, which are to be
integrated into the architecture of cyberspace. Still, the document goes on to argue that
these norms are not new, but rather are extensions of the already-existing norms that
guide international relations, the “rules that promote order and peace, advance basic
human dignity, and promote freedom in economic competition.”33
At present “cyberspace” has no universally accepted or codified norms, and its
governance structure remains in its infancy. As such, the US Strategy suggests five
principles that “provide a basic roadmap” to guide how states‟ policies concerning the
Internet: fundamental freedoms should be upheld; intellectual property rights must be
respected and protected; individual privacy should be valued as a priority; states should
cooperate in international cybercrime investigations; and finally, states should enjoy the
right to self-defense against “aggressive acts in cyberspace”34
In order to achieve its policy objectives, and “help promulgate positive norms,”35
the US strategy combines diplomatic, defensive, and developmental initiatives. The US
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asserts that the benefits of connectivity are universal, and thus remains committed to
“ensuring others benefit from our technical resources and expertise.”36 Diplomatically,
the policy states that the US will “create incentives” for other states and private actors to
embrace the stated behavioral norms and guiding principles.37 And in terms of
development, it will continue to provide the “knowledge and capacity” to build and/or
support new and existing digital networks around the world.38
The defensive portion of the strategy is especially interesting as it highlights the
importance and novelty of cyberspace as a focus of international relations and a new front
for modern warfare. The strategy is clear that the US “reserve[s] the right to use all
necessary means-diplomatic, informational, military, and economic- as appropriate…to
defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.”39 This sentiment echoes
that of U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Lynn III, who wrote in an article for
Foreign Affairs40 (subsequently published on the U.S. Department of Defense‟s
website41) that “as a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace
as a new domain in warefare…[one that is] just as critical to military operations as land,
sea, air, and space.”42
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Chapter II: Analysis of the Connectivity Doctrine
Before analyzing the Connectivity Doctrine through the Foucauldian lens of
governmentality, it is worthwhile to examine some of its rhetoric, claims, policies and
inconsistencies in greater detail. In the following section I will situate the contemporary
Doctrine as part of a long evolving “techno-utopian” discourse. I will then examine the
role of trusteeship and claims to authority within the Doctrine. Finally, I will highlight
some of the logical, intellectual, and practical inconsistencies within the rhetoric and
policies associated with the Connectivity Doctrine.

2.1 Cyber-Utopianism and Techno-Optimism:
Historic and Present Variations
From the printing press to the Blackberry, technological advances have long
inspired optimistic conjectures about the potential impacts they might have on society.
These have often been welcomed as harbingers of human progress and are given
immense credit for societal improvement. At the same time, there has also been a
concurrent discourse of techno-pessimism that rejects such optimistic assertions.
Prometheus and Frankenstein along with modern concerns about atomic energy and the
“singularity43,” are all part of this long history of criticism that warns of the dangers of
“playing god” through technological advances.
Despite this debate‟s long history, both discourses continue to make their
arguments for or against the adoption of new technology. These arguments remain
largely the same as their historic variations, altered only as necessary to address the
43
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technology-du jour. True to form, and with perhaps more fervor than ever before, technoenthusiasts are now making broad claims about the transformative, empowering, and
democratic effects the Internet and other information and communications technologies
(ICT) may have on individuals and societies the world over. Such claims are not
necessarily without merit, as technology has undoubtedly had a tremendous effect on
human society throughout history. However, the historic record is riddled with examples
of times when the techno-optimism discourse has failed to deliver on many of its
promises.
In the fifteenth century, the printing press revolutionized the production and
dissemination of information, which many credit with making possible the Renaissance,
the Protestant Reformation, the scientific revolution, and the birth of modern democracy.
In the nineteenth century, the electrical telegraph ushered in a new era of global
communication and international relations along with promises of unprecedented world
peace.44 Likewise, many heralded the advent of the “flying machine” in the twentieth
century as a technological achievement that would “erase international boundaries
associated with nations, languages, and money” and subsequently bring about a
“brotherhood of man.”45
These romantic accounts of technology‟s contribution to human progress are often
as misleading as the techno-enthusiasts‟ promises. They all too easily overlook the
potentially negative consequences of so-called “liberation technology”46 and instead,
overemphasize the positive effects of these tools. Keeping with the previous examples for
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instance, the printing press certainly made it simpler to spread information to mass
audiences, but it also facilitated increased state control over populations via the
production of more effective propaganda and gave rise to more robust practices of
censorship. Similarly, the use of the telegraph (and its succeeding technologies) and the
development of aeronautics allowed for unprecedented communication and travel, yet
their use in warfare contributed to the bloodiest century in human history.47 Such
consequences are generally accepted as justifiable (albethey negative) externalities, as the
social benefits are argued to exceed any unfavorable effects. Thus, even while
acknowledging that all technology comes with potentially deleterious repercussions, its
advocates persistently promote advances in ICT as being universally beneficial.
In recent years, the benefits of new technology have often been framed in terms of
economic opportunities or democratic empowerment. In the1980s, it was Xerox
machines, VCRs and fax machines that were supposed to (and later romantically credited
with) toppling communism and usher in liberal-democratic regimes, one reproduction at a
time. Likewise, the Internet was marketed to the US consumer population as an
egalitarian and liberatory technology when it first became publicly available in the
1990s.48 Accounts from the Internet‟s early years hypothesized that it would
revolutionize all existing institutions; communication systems would be democratized,
corporations would be forced to act more responsibly, governments would become more
transparent, and there would be a global renaissance in education.49
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While the dreams of the 1990s never fully came to fruition,50 the same promises
and arguments are being made today as ICT and connectivity are promoted globally as
universally beneficial in both the economic and political realms alike. Again, the
potentially harmful effects are readily acknowledged (identity theft, unauthorized
surveillance, decreased privacy, etc.), they simply are downplayed as the acceptable risks
of an otherwise positive technology.
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2.2 Technology, Knowledge, and Power
Of course there is some truth to the positive assertions made concerning
technology; each innovation was indeed employed as a means to achieve some users‟
desired ends. Still, technology and knowledge are far from being neutral products or
concepts. Each has deep rooted ideological, political, and economic imperatives that
influence their development. What is often missing from the techno-optimism discourse
(besides the negative externalities) is a discussion regarding the intimate connection
between power and knowledge production and management.
Michel Foucault argues that the basic premise of power is knowledge, and that
through appropriating and (re)producing knowledge, modern power thereby reproduces
and strengthens itself.51 As such, agents of hegemonic power have long been concerned
with the production and management of both knowledge and technology. These interests
are separate but complimentary, as technology has long played an integral role in the
production, delivery, and consumption of knowledge. And as technology advances,
power adapts accordingly, incorporating it into its „truth‟ manufacturing and
dissemination processes.
Modern hegemonic power networks52 privilege and promote the forms of
knowledge and technology that ensure their continuity. Technology is systematically
employed to produce, code, and order knowledge in such a manner so that its recipients
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accept it and internalize it as truth, reproduce it, and redistribute it. While the actors have
changed, this process is not all that different from the methods employed by Western
Imperial powers in their attempts to colonize new territories (this will be examined
further in subsequent chapters).

2.3 Strategic use of History in Techno-Optimism Rhetoric
Like their techno-utopian-minded predecessors, modern cyber-enthusiasts often
conjure up sanitized versions of history to support their optimistic stance. The most
common historical references made by Western advocates of the Connectivity Doctrine
have to do with the Cold War and the (arguably overemphasized) role fax machines,
Xerox machines, and VCRs played in toppling the Soviet Empire. Secretary Clinton
recently made such an allusion in her 2010 speech on Internet freedom, warning that a
new “information curtain” is beginning to divide the world and that in response, “viral
videos and blog posts are becoming the samizdat53 of our day.”54 Similarly, Senator
Arlen Specter argued that the U.S. should find ways to help foreign nationals breech the
firewalls erected by their governments because “tearing down these walls can have the
same effect of what happened when the Berlin Wall was torn down.”55 Many other
politicians and pundits from within and outside the United States are also quick to draw
parallels from the Cold War.56
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There are several problems with drawing such parallels: they are historically
inaccurate; they oversimplify complex issues; and they can result in severely misguided
policy initiatives. Touching on the first issue, while rhetorically appealing, the Internet is
extremely different than technologies that were widely used in the 1980s. Fax machines
and photocopiers certainly simplified the proliferation of samizdat literature, but the risk
was minimal, as was (arguably) their utility. Unlike 1980s-era technology, the Internet
can serve an infinite number of purposes and harbors far more risk for those who use it to
challenge oppressive regimes. For example, the Internet can just as easily be used as a
surveillance mechanism or a carrier of propaganda as it can be to organize
demonstrations or pass along oppositional information.57 And unlike Xeroxed
reproductions, information published online can often be easily and quickly traced back
to its point of origin.
While historic parallels and metaphors can be rhetorically appealing, they tend to
oversimplify issues and leave critical factors not included in the metaphor left
unexamined, thus “creat[ing] the illusion of complete intellectual mastery of an issue.”58
They often emphasize certain aspects of an issue to make a point, while ignoring other
aspects that do not fit the intended abstraction. Furthermore, theoretical devices like these
frequently have the effect of implicitly suggesting solutions based on their own referent,
even if these solutions are not explicitly stated. These (perhaps) unintended consequences
can have profound implications on how policymakers understand and respond to a given
situation. In the present case, the metaphor suggests that, similar to the Berlin Wall and
the Iron Curtain, firewalls simply need to be destroyed or circumvented and democracy
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will inevitably and peacefully follow. What is left out is that physical walls are much
more expensive and require far more time and manpower to erect than virtual walls. Such
misguided optimism creates an “illusory sense of finality and irreversibility”59 that can be
as seductive as it is dangerous. Focusing only on technological ease, this line of
argumentation ignores the sociopolitical nature of the issue and neglects the enormous
risks involved.

2.4 Unique qualities of modern ICT and the
Connectivity Doctrine’s Contradictory Nature
There are certainly similarities between the spread of ICT and the adoption of past
technologies. However, there are several characteristics of modern technology that make
it truly revolutionary60 and unlike anything that came before. One noteworthy example is
that cyber-technologies are the fastest diffusing communication technology in history61
and have facilitated the “democratization of communication” to a degree few other
technologies have achieved.62 Furthermore, although they are the consequence of all
technological systems, the socio-political ramifications of modern ICT are especially
pronounced due to their necessary interactions with and influences on the multifaceted
processes of globalization. Countless actors simultaneously help shape and are shaped by
their interactions within cyberspace on a daily basis, making it a constantly evolving
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domain, rather than a static artifact or tool, like the copy machine, fax machine, or
VCR.63
The unique qualities of modern ICT makes it especially difficult to regulate and
govern. This difficulty is especially evident in the US-led attempt to institutionalize
universal rules and norms and behavior for cyberspace. As a consequence, obvious
inconsistencies are present in the Connectivity Doctrine in terms of its theory and
application.
One of the more troublesome inconsistencies lies in how the Doctrine subjects
Internet freedom to liberal notions of governmental sovereignty. The Doctrine also has
trouble defining what it means by “Internet freedom.” The Doctrine embraces broad
rights for private corporations to restrict access to content in the name of “intellectual
property,” while at the same time cautioning against governmental restrictions of Internet
content. Likewise, it argues that while on the one hand, WikiLeaks threatened the
security of people around the world, governments should still strive for maximum
transparency.
The Doctrine is also unclear on the extent of governmental sovereignty and state
rights. It seemingly wants to have it both ways; it promotes a free and open Internet that
is assessable to all, but also maintains that the government has the final say in what
material should be kept confidential. While it may be reasonable for a regime that rules
with its people‟s consent to assume a limited right to keep certain information secret in
order to protect its citizens, the Connectivity Doctrine offers a very biased understanding
of what is included in this protection. For instance, restricting access to material that is
culturally offensive or otherwise runs counter to prevailing dominant values is not
63
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included in this limited, yet ambiguous, definition. Restrictions resulting from concerns
over morality (such as access to pornographic material) or potentially harmful content
(such as hate speech) are deemed illegitimate by the Doctrine‟s reasoning. Thus, although
confusing, the Doctrine seems to argue that states have the right to determine what is
appropriate for public consumption, but only if their final determination coincides with
the US‟s view.
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Chapter III: Theoretical Framework: Biopolitics and Governmentality
Now that the Connectivity Doctrine has been defined, dissected, and historically
contextualized, I will shift the focus to theory to determine how Michel Foucault‟s
understanding of Governmentality might augment our understanding of its underlying
goals and implications. I will first provide a brief overview of the theory‟s major tenets
before demonstrating how it applies to the present study.

3.1 Governmentality: A Brief Overview
Foucault‟s work on governmentality came at the end of his short, but prolific
career. While touching on the subject in his earlier work, Foucault did not fully explore
the notion of governmentality until his lectures at the College de France in the years
immediately preceding his death. Admired by many devotees who praise his theories and
criticized by an equally fervent camp of scholars who dismiss his philosophy for various
reasons, Foucault has long been one of the most oft-cited theorists of all time.64 Still, the
recently published transcriptions65 of his final lectures have brought about another
resurgence of interest in his work. What is striking about this recent wave of intrigue is
how much his final lectures have changed scholarly opinion about Foucault‟s philosophy.
Rather than being referenced as a “thinker of power,” as he was in the 1980s and 1990s
when his name was virtually synonymous with the term, Foucault is increasingly
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becoming regarded as a “thinker of subjectivity.”66 This shift in viewpoint of the scholar
reflects the theoretical revisions Foucault made to his earlier work during his lectures on
governmentality. Foucault introduced the notion of governmentality as a “necessary
critique” of his previous conceptions of power; 67 the concept addresses some of the
limitations of his earlier work and presents a novel understanding of modern power
relations in Western societies.68
One of the most dramatic differences between Foucault‟s earlier work and his
analysis of governmentality is his shift in understanding of power. In his later work,
Foucault stresses that modern power is principally about guidance and “structuring and
shaping the field of possible action of subjects.”69 Consensus and coercion remain
relevant, but are reformulated as “means of government;” “they are „elements‟ or
„instruments‟ rather than the foundation or source of power relations.”70
Here Foucault makes a shift in his understanding of power and domination, terms
that he previously used interchangeably. In a theoretical improvement on his earlier work,
Foucault now carefully differentiates between power and domination. He explains that
domination is a particular, asymmetrical type of power relationship, in which the
subordinated individuals and groups have an extremely limited margin of freedom.71 As
an alternative to power-as-domination, Foucault introduces the theoretical notion of
power relations as “strategic games between liberties,” which seek to structure the field
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of possible actions and guide the behaviors of individuals who ultimately decide their
own course of action.72
This marks another radical theoretical shift in Foucault‟s thinking. Foucault‟s
earlier studies on the analytics of power focused on the impact of disciplinary processes
on “docile bodies” in the formation of subjects.73 Many prominent scholars (including
Jurgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser, Charles Taylor, etc.) criticize this interpretation of
subjectivity for being “monolithic relativism,” citing its neglect to recognize individual
agency and the potential for resistance.74 In response, Foucault makes clear in his later
work that “an analytics of government demands the recognition of the „other‟ as the
subject of action” and that “power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar
as they are „free.‟”75 He further concedes that individuals do have autonomous agency
that allows them to “transform themselves in order to attain a certain desired state.”76
Now viewing power as a relationship, rather than simply domination, Foucault
introduces the notion of government to analyze the connections between “technologies of
domination” and what he now calls “technologies of the self.”77 In other words,
“governors” still attempt to guide the behaviors of individuals, but individuals remain
free to conduct themselves as they please. In contrast to power-as-domination, Foucault
explains that “governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor
wants,” instead, “it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts
between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is
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constructed or modified by himself.”78 Likewise, the “techniques of government” do not
forcibly or directly shape the actions of individual or collective actors, but instead set the
conditions of possible actions.79
Foucault defines “government” as “the set of institutions and practices, from
administration to education, through which people‟s conduct is guided.”80 More
concisely, governmentality is simply, “the conduct of human conduct.”81 As direct as this
definition is, its simplicity is deceptive. Semantically linking the act of „governing‟
(„gouverner‟) and „modes of thought‟ („mentalité‟),82 governmentality is presented as a
modern manifestation of power that seeks to “shape human conduct by calculated
means.” 83 The simplified definition expresses this by playing on numerous senses of the
word „conduct.‟ ‘To conduct’ refers to leadership, in that an actor is directing or guiding
another how best to carry out a task. A reference to a particular understanding of morality
or value system is implied when the word is used as a reflexive verb, ‘to conduct
oneself;’ alluding to certain forms of behavior that are deemed appropriate in specific
situations. A related sense of the word, the noun ‘conduct,’ is also used to define an
individual‟s actions or behaviors, again with the supposition that there exist agreed upon
modes of (appropriate) conduct.84
Usages of the various terms are almost invariably normative and evaluative. They
presume standards or norms of behavior that serve as the ideal by which individual
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conduct can be assessed.85 And in almost all cases, a notion of guidance or regulation is
inferred; a presumption that not only is it possible to direct behavior, but also that agents
exist whose responsibility it is to ensure this control occurs.86 Combining the various
senses of the word „conduct‟ and their associated presumptions, Mitchell Dean puts forth
the following, expanded definition of government:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity,
undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a
variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape
conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and
beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a
diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and
outcomes.87

This definition exhibits the novelty of Foucault‟s analytics of government and
demonstrates how governmentality employs, but remains distinct from, sovereign and
disciplinary power. The classic understanding of sovereign power is concerned primarily
with securing and expanding the territorial reach of the sovereign’s realm. The sovereign
has absolute authority to issue edicts, punish enemies, and determine who will live or
die.88 In contrast, the focus of governmentality is not on territory or riches, but rather on
the population it governs. The art of governance requires the governing body to receive
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authorization to exercise authority.89 Rather than “wreak[ing] havoc with
impunity…violence must be justified by a notion of improvement. Its purpose cannot be
mere plunder or domination.”90
Likewise, Foucault‟s understanding of governmentality is distinct from
disciplinary power. While disciplinary power seeks to establish order (in specific groups
of people or things) via “technologies of domination” such as detailed supervision, laws
and/or punitive measures, the purpose of government is to protect the welfare of a given
population and improve its overall condition.91 Whether this means decreasing
unemployment, providing better healthcare, improving education, or increasing access to
information and communication technology, the focus is not on the individual, (as it is in
disciplinary institutions such as prisons, asylums, and schools) but rather on the
population as a whole. Disciplinary power alone is insufficient for such lofty aims. At
such a grand level, physical coercion and training of each individual is impossible, as is
the detailed regulation of their actions. Instead, governmental techniques operate by
“educating desires and configuring [the] habits, aspirations and beliefs” of a given
population.92 Instead of brute coercion or ubiquitous regulation, conditions are artificially
set in such a manner that individuals may not necessarily be aware that their conduct is
being conducted; rather, “people, following their own self interest, will do as they
ought.”93
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Foucault explains that there are two related but distinct sides of governmentality
(both reviewed above), one dealing with the rationalization of exercising power and the
construction of specific forms of intervention and the other dealing with processes of
subjectification. The first allows those governing to define “problems” that need to be
addressed by identifying and demarcating the pertinent concepts, objects, and borders of
assessment. The second refers to the codependent nature of governmental institutions and
autonomous, individual actors.94 While Foucault‟s analytics of government focus on
power relationships between the modern sovereign state and a domestic population,
NGOs, international political and economic institutions, and other governing agencies use
the same governmental techniques in their various policies and development projects to
guide the behaviors of individuals throughout the world.
Demonstrating this point in her work on developmental programs in Indonesia,
The Will to Improve, Tanya Murray Li examines the means by which outside “experts”
are able to diagnose problems, develop solutions to solve said “problems,” and otherwise
intervene in communities of which they are not a part. These experts and other external
participants act as “trustees,” a role that she explains is “defined by the claim to know
how others should live, to know what is best for them [and] to know what they need.”95
While Li‟s focus is on the various attempts to “improve the lives” of people in Indonesia
through targeted reform, her underlying logic applies perfectly to the Connectivity
Doctrine‟s proposed goal of global improvement and progress via connectivity.
As a governmental stratagem, trusteeship requires some degree of approval
before policies are enacted. An NGO, for instance, cannot implement a development plan
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in a country by forceful coercion alone. It must, instead, appeal for public consent
directly or otherwise set conditions by which to ensure official endorsement of their plan.
This is not to imply any nefarious intentions; on the contrary, the trustees‟ objective is not
typically to dominate others, but rather to “develop the capacities of another,” “enhance
their capacity for action, and to direct it.”96 Their intentions are thus often altruistic,
desiring nothing more than to “make the world a better place.” Whatever their proposed
course of action for solving the identified problems may be, it is believed to be for the
betterment of the common good – the health of the population at large, the stimulation of
economic growth, the fostering of democratic values, etc. And the solutions often appear
commonsensical, as the “natural expression of the everyday interactions of individuals
and groups.” 97 Still, regardless of the altruistic intentions that often drive these plans,
“the claim to expertise in optimizing the lives of others is a claim to power, one the
merits careful scrutiny.”98

3.2 Governmentality, Biopolitics, and Liberalism
Governmentality, as a “technology of security” employed for the “regulatory
control of a population” developed in large part as the modern nation-state‟s response to
the unique properties of classical liberalism. First developed in 17th century Britain, this
political ideology rejected the idea of absolute monarchy and the Divine Right of Kings,
and instead embraced individual rights, minimal government, and a free-market
economic system. The role of government, according to this view, was limited to
protecting the populace from foreign aggressors and providing public services and
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institutions that were not profitable when managed within the private sector. The
challenges posed by this system, which in many ways represented a new and innovative
“art of governance” in its own right and threatened the very purpose of the state,
necessitated a drastic adaptation of the role and function of governmental power.
More than simply an economic theory or a political ideology, liberalism emerged
as a unique system of governing human beings, with the new epistemic figure of the
population as its target and political economy as its principal form of knowledge.99
Governmentality thus adopted certain liberal rationalities to guide state power. As
divinely ordained power was no longer deemed legitimate, laws now had to be enacted in
accordance to a newly defined “natural order” based on the market‟s principles of
efficiency and self-regulation. Similarly, “economic reasoning” was to assess the merits
and usefulness of governmental action; rather than physical domination and disciplinary
control, the focus was shifted to creating spaces for market expansion.100
The neo-liberal reforms enacted by numerous countries over the past few decades
clearly demonstrate the success and global extension of Foucault‟s notion of
governmentality. By redefining the social sphere as part of the economic realm, neoliberal regimes have been able to develop “indirect techniques for leading and controlling
individuals” while at the same time redirecting social risks such as illness,
unemployment, poverty, etc. into the domain of individual responsibility.101 The
effectiveness of this epistemological shift is clearly illustrated in the contemporary
understanding of homo oeconomicus, or the rational-economic individual, which is now
defined by an artificially arranged, yet purportedly instinctual entrepreneurial and
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competitive behavior.102 In this way, assuming responsibility for matters and problems
that had previously been the domain of state agencies has become a bizarre “reward” for
those who accept that this “liberty” is a gift.103
The widespread adoption of neo-liberalism marks a fundamental shift in the
modern state‟s raison d‟etre; rather than territorial expansion, the market is now its
“organizing and regulative principle.”104 The fundamental task of the modern liberaldemocratic state is to “universalize competition and invent market-shaped systems of
action for individuals, groups and institutions.”105 What were previously sacrosanct,
“extra-economic domains are now rendered „economic‟ and are colonized by criteria of
economic efficiency.”106 In keeping with this fundamental task, the Connectivity
Doctrine employs governmental techniques in order to integrate market ideology into the
Internet‟s architecture in a manner that presents liberal norms and values as “natural” and
inevitable. In this way, the Doctrine conditions Internet users‟ behaviors in such a way
that market logic is internalized and reflected in their virtual actions. In other words,
Internet users‟ conduct is being conducted, even if they are unaware this is the case.
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Chapter IV:
Governmentality and the Internet or
The Conduct of Cyber Conduct
Despite the rhetorical promotion of freedom, empowerment and progress, the
seemingly innocuous Connectivity Doctrine takes on an entirely different meaning (with
much broader implications) when viewed through the lens of governmentality; after all,
“to govern the Internet is to govern people.”107 By applying the “analytics of
government” to the Doctrine, a more calculated political strategy begins to unfold, one
whose ultimate aim reaches far beyond simply „freedom,‟ as its proponents suggest.
The United States has positioned itself as the leader of Internet freedom and for
all intents and purposes, represents the embodiment of the Connectivity Doctrine. As
such, the U.S. stands as the key agent seeking to “conduct the conduct” of individuals in
cyberspace,108 and its official speeches and policies can be regarded as instruments or
techniques of governmentality. That said, cyberspace is not a typical territory with fixed
borders, and its “inhabitants” do not meet the standard definition of “citizen.” Rather, the
sovereignty of cyberspace remains highly contested and activities that occur therein often
have dramatic effects in the “real world.” Thus, when US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton states that the U.S.‟s Internet freedom policy is “about what kind of world we
want…a planet with one Internet, one global community, and a common body of
knowledge,”109 she is implicitly suggesting that the U.S.‟s agenda is not only concerned
107
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with influencing cyber governance, but is ultimately concerned with shaping the structure
of the physical world and guiding the behaviors of its inhabitants.
As defined by Foucault, government is typically concerned with improving the
welfare of a domestic population (by increasing the GDP, lowering infant mortality rates,
improving education, etc.). However, the population of interest does not necessarily need
to be comprised of citizens of a particular state. Instead, Secretary Clinton alludes to
governance that extends to a global population of the Connected, one that uses
biopolitical power to work through a singular “global community”110 in order to deliver
“the greatest possible benefits to the world.”111 The population of concern here are not
Americans (or its allies, or its enemies for that matter), but rather “all of humanity.”112
An integral characteristic of Foucault‟s understanding of governmentality is the
ability of those governing to exact influence over human conduct without the individual‟s
explicit knowledge or consent. This is done not through direct force, but rather by
“setting conditions to encourage people to behave as they ought.”113 Individuals may not
know they are being “conducted,” and instead believe they are acting in their own selfinterest.
In shaping the architecture of the Internet, the Connectivity Doctrine sets virtual
conditions in a manner that encourages users to internalize certain norms and values as
uncontested, natural, neutral and/or inevitable. Its proponents thus ensure that an
increasingly expanding connected global population conforms to their preferred version
of liberal ideology. Users become connected seemingly of their own free will, responding
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to the many advertised benefits of connectivity: instantaneous communication, increased
access to information, low-cost entry into a global marketplace, business efficiency, etc.
Still, in becoming connected (in the dominant, Western sense), users tacitly accept a set
of behavioral norms and values that are set by those seeking to shape and govern
cyberspace.
As more and more individuals become connected, cyberspace‟s „population‟
grows, and with it the pool of „governable‟ subjects. The U.S. and other advocates of the
Connectivity Doctrine are likewise concerned with the general welfare of the connected
population; they believe their technical expertise and purported moral superiority leave
them responsible for instituting the proper regulations that will improve the wellbeing of
the Connected. Thus the Connectivity Doctrine (as discourse) insists that there is a
“singular valid shape for the network‟s architecture” and that this sole version represents
“the peoples‟ interests.”114 Again, this appeal to users for their approval is where
governmentality differs from sovereign power. Sovereign power would simply demand
compliance and obedience. Instead, modern power networks employ governmental
techniques to convince a globally diverse, connected population that its policies serve
their greater interests and likewise set the conditions in such a manner that individuals
choose to become connected.
The improvement of a population writ large constitutes the central purpose of
liberal government and explains the motivation of those seeking to influence the
architecture of cyberspace. Nevertheless, how this is done (without physical coercion)
requires further clarification. To „conduct the conduct‟ of an individual assumes that the
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one being governed is a capable political actor and therefore, a “locus of freedom.”115 It
likewise assumes the possibility that the governed are capable of thinking and behaving
differently than desired. Liberal modes of government work through this freedom and try
to shape it, 116 conceiving it as a “technical means of securing the ends of government.”117
Rather than denying the individual actor her freedom, liberal rationalities “attempt to
define the nature, source, effects and possible utility of these capacities of acting and
thinking.”118

4.1 Cyber Governmentality Via “Human Rights”
By situating the Connectivity Doctrine within the broader Human Rights
discourse, the US depoliticizes the highly contested nature of technology and the cultural
and symbolic understandings thereof. The very formulation of Internet freedom as a
fundamental human right is universalistic in nature and serves as an extension of
Western, hegemonic discourse. Likewise, the Connectivity Doctrine‟s model of Internet
freedom is largely premised on the US‟s understanding of free speech. As such,
unrestricted access to the Internet is the ideal norm and any sort of censorship or
restricted access is seen as an illegitimate claim to power and an affront to human rights.
Such a liberal definition of free speech is problematic if for no other reason than it
is a distinctly US definition. Several states have limits on speech, including several US
allies. Many European countries, for instance, have laws against holocaust denial, and
have made it illegal to publish websites that espouse such claims. According to the
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Connectivity Doctrine, however, individuals and groups should be free to present their
views online and these sites should be freely accessible to all; no country should limit
their production.
Likewise, the US, and many of its allies, view pornography as a commodity that
can be bought and sold (provided all relevant parties are consenting adults). With such a
substantial role in shaping its content, the Connectivity Doctrine leaves no room for states
to censor pornographic material on religious or cultural grounds; rather, individual users
should be free to choose whether or not to view such content. While a more thorough
examination of this point is beyond the purview of this paper, for present purposes it is
sufficient to note that the Connectivity Doctrine‟s position of Human Rights, Free
Speech, and Internet Freedom are all premised on particular understandings of the terms
and are not necessarily universally applicable or valid.
The Doctrine‟s identification of a particular network architecture as the harbinger
of [Western-defined] universal human rights trumps competing norms of communal
rights, self-determination, or national sovereignty.119 As Daniel McCarthy of the Centre
for International Studies and Diplomacy at the University of London argues, this line of
argumentation is an example of the US‟s larger post-Cold War attempt to alter the
international understanding of sovereignty. Claiming a monopoly on “authoritative
knowledge,” the US advances a catchall definition of sovereignty, which deems states
that do not adhere to modern, liberal norms120 as not properly sovereign.121
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While the Connectivity Doctrine is often framed as being part of a broader
Human Rights discourse, the issues are far greater than simply “individual freedom” or
“universal rights.” Furthermore, its policy implications go well beyond basic domestic,
foreign, or even cyber realms. The Connectivity Doctrine is ultimately concerned with
shaping the structure of the world and guiding the behaviors of its inhabitants. Clinton is
surprisingly upfront about the political, economic and ideological agendas that the
Doctrine serves. She readily admits that “no country more than America stands to
benefit” from what a globally free Internet can offer, and that information technology can
absolutely “help advance [the US and its allies‟] diplomatic and development
objectives.”122 To this point Clinton adds: “it‟s about what kind of world we want…a
planet with one Internet, one global community, and a common body of knowledge.”123
In this vein, the US seeks to control the terms of the debate over the correct
architecture of the Internet and its governance so that its position appears to be the only
rational and logical possibility. The Connectivity Doctrine‟s core arguments are framed
as though they are the results of a “pre-given technological rationality” rather than the
outcome of a politically contested process. The success of such argumentation is
achieved by means of “technological closure,” through which targeted problems
seemingly disappear as new technological norms become increasingly internalized within
a society as natural and uncontroversial until they eventually become routine and taken
for granted. 124
In the case of information and communication technology for instance,
proponents of the Connectivity Doctrine first identify authoritarian, non-liberal states
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with contradictory ICT policies as problematic. Such states are subsequently labeled
illegitimate and criticized for not being in line with the interests of their population
(interests which are often conveniently defined by the same hegemonic powers that
embrace the Doctrine). The Connectivity Doctrine is then presented as the best solution
to solve the perceived deficits and the model that can serve the needs of the problematic
states‟ population more effectively than those offered by non-liberal states. Those
advocating for this particular, singular global Internet architecture thus identify both the
problem and the solution while at the same time imbibing ICT with symbolic meaning. In
this way, they can establish the legitimacy of their claims by highlighting examples of
connectivity‟s success, without addressing the more contentious aspects of the Doctrine.
Any misgivings concerning the proposed “solution” become secondary issues, as the
“success” helps establish the technological artifact as an accepted part of the social
environment.125
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Chapter V: The Biopolitics of Connectivity126
In 1997, as the Internet was still just beginning to gain mass popularity, journalist
Jon Katz wrote an article for Wired magazine about the emergence of a new kind of
people he called “the Connected.” These were not simply tech-savvy individuals who
used the Internet, but rather constituted a distinct category of people with unique
characteristics who could be identified and studied as a whole. The Connected, he argues,
are “knowledgeable, tolerant…[p]rofoundly optimistic about the future…[and] convinced
that technology is a force for good.”127 They also tend to favor a free-market economic
system, which they believe to be a powerful engine of progress.128
Katz was referring specifically to the birth of „the Connected‟ in the U.S., yet the
rapid proliferation of information and communication technologies (ICT) has caused a
global surge in this new category of people, and with it, a resurgence of technoutopianism. Among the leading academics touting the liberatory potential of connectivity
are Manuel Castells, the world‟s foremost-cited communications scholar, and James
Rosenau, former president of the International Studies Association. Both agree that the
Connected constitute a new type of socius that may represent the very “transformation of
sociability itself.”129 Rosenau further argues that the Connected are more skilled, more
competent, and more imaginative than any other historical social formation.130
These scholars, and those that share their opinion, contend that this revolutionary
change in humanity also initiated a “major transformation of the global structures that
126

This title is borrowed from Julian Reid‟s article “Politicizing Connectivity: Beyond the Biopolitics of
Information Technology in International Relations,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 22,
Number 4 (December 2009): 608.
127
Jon Katz, “The Digital Citizen,” Wired 5.2 (December 1997)
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.12/netizen_pr.html (Accessed January 29, 2012).
128
A scientific survey of 1,444 randomly selected Americans later confirmed his hypothesis. Ibid.
129
Castells quoted in Reid 2009, 608.
130
Reid 2009, 608.

50

govern world affairs.” 131 Cyber-utopians argue that this process is transforming “existing
institutions and practices of state sovereignty into something more benign and beneficent
to human life on a global scale.”132 Connectivity is seen here as something organic and
natural, the “outcome of a historical process of gradual increases in the evolutionary
powers of the human species.”133
It is important to note here, again, that within the cyber-utopian argument,
information technologies are assumed to be politically neutral. However, connectivity is
not an inevitable evolutionary step, but is rather a potential evolutionary capacity that
ICT can foster, provided certain conditions are met. What this means is that the “advance
of the Connected” depends on the “securing of strategic conditions in which the
Connected can be constituted.”134 Therein lies the political dimension of connectivity, as
liberal governments seek to secure said conditions, they are inevitably acting in
accordance with an ideological agenda. Liberal regimes, through modern technologies of
government and security (political actions), “configure habits” and “set conditions” to
ensure people “do as they ought,”135 i.e., become part of the Connected.
Foucault explains that the modern liberal project embodies a unique “faith in its
ability to correlate the political development of humanity with a knowledge of its
biological properties and capacities.” Likewise, its success has depended on “strategies to
promote those tendencies and habits within governed populations which accord with the
„biological destiny of the species.‟”136 As such, if connectivity is understood to be an
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“evolutionary capacity” that requires certain prerequisites be met before it can develop,
liberal governmentality is concerned with promoting those tendencies and habits that
ensure these conditions are met.
This further demonstrates how ICT are far from neutral tools, but are instead
highly political “technologies of security” which liberal regimes employ to promote the
“optimal and proper functioning of the economic, vital, and social processes” of a given
population.137 Furthermore, technology is never merely a tool; rather, “[its use] is a way
of enframing the human as a thing that both uses and can be made use of.”138 In the case
of connectivity, subjects must be taught how to be connective. Connective habits must be
instilled so that individuals can be subjected to the “lore of connectivity.”139 This is why
ICT proliferation is so central to the Connectivity Doctrine. Information has become the
hegemonic organizational code, thus there is great interest in controlling information (or
at least regulating how it is produced, disseminated, and received). As Julian Reid notes,
“[i]n embracing information politically, we subject ourselves to a biopoliticized account
of connectivity. We become informatic subjects, performing the works of a global
political order in which the very problem of order – and the problem of your and my
place in it – is conceived in informational terms.”140
Guided by liberal rationalities, connected regimes benefit from the expansion of
the Connected population, and thus have a vested interest in “converting” those who
remain disconnected. As such, the Connectivity Doctrine‟s rhetoric is often highly
optimistic, promising unparalleled personal and societal improvement, or else the benefits

137

Dean 2010, 29.
Reid 2009, 612.
139
Ibid.
140
Reid 2009, 615.
138

52

of connectivity are simply assumed and presented as obvious. This is an example of what
Foucault terms “mentalities of government;” a term which refers to governmental
practices that become embedded in language or are otherwise taken for granted. Such
mentalities are not usually subject to debate and are simply accepted as authoritative.141
This governmental technique allows for the production of “truth,” which can be used to
condition and direct the conduct of a population.142
In a demonstration of just how effective these mentalities of government have
been in neutralizing the issue, connectivity has now become a metric by which
international institutions, academics, and others evaluate the well-being of human life
throughout the world. To remain disconnected is interpreted as being at best primitive
(lacking the capacities to become connected), or at worst threatening. Similarly,
connectivity has become analogous with freedom and progress, thus imbuing the issue
with both moral and security implications. Morally, the Connected feel obliged to
shepherd the Disconnected into modernity so they too can reap its rewards. As a security
issue, “disconnectedness defines danger” to the Connected, as it is within this population
where they are likely to find “instability” and “threats to the functioning of the
international system and the global economy.”143 As such, rather than being a “natural
evolutionary capacity,” connectivity is a security project hinging on the subjection of
humanity to the Connectivity Doctrine. And like all security projects, it is a violent one,
for the Connected must resort to force whenever it encounters people who are hostile to
its Doctrine.144 As former advisor to the US Secretary of Defense, Thomas P.M. Barnett
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writes: “Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a
supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will.”145 Whichever
the case, “disconnected peoples must be made into connected ones.”146

5.1 Connectivity and Capitalism
The Internet has certainly had transformative effects in countless arenas, still it
has failed to deliver on many of its champions‟ more ambitious promises, particularly
those having to do with its ability to precipitate social equality or economic prosperity.
This is not to say that the Internet is devoid of liberatory potential. Quite the contrary, this
cyber network, still in its infancy,147 continues to possess extraordinary democratic and
revolutionary promise. However, technologies do not exist in a vacuum; rather, “they are
developed in a social, political, and economic context.” 148 These factors have absolutely
shaped the course of the so-called „digital revolution‟ and their influence remains everpresent in the Connectivity Doctrine.
The historic and contextual development of the Internet highlights its paradoxical
existence. Contrary to the prevailing logic, the Internet has not always been a haven for
individualism, and capitalist entrepreneurialism. Rather, this particular field of digital
communication was developed almost entirely through government subsidized and
directed research. Indeed, had it been left to the private sector, “the Internet never would
have come into existence.”149 Still, although it was created as a free and open public
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sphere, separate from the world of commodity exchange, the Internet quickly became
subjected to the processes of capital accumulation, as its maintenance and access
increasingly became the purview of private corporations. As a result, the Internet has
evolved into a virtual private sphere of “increasingly closed, proprietary, even
monopolistic markets.”150 Such markets have logics of their own, which are all too
frequently inimical to democratic practices. Ironically, the very structure of the Internet
runs counter to market logic. And as such, there are inherent problems with allowing the
profit motive to dictate its development;151 weaknesses that help explain why the
Connectivity Doctrine has failed to deliver on some of its promises.
As an intangible, virtual network, the Internet has always had awkward footing
within a market system based on supply and demand. The main reason for this is that the
Internet is neither a scarce resource nor a consumable commodity, but is rather a medium
by which users can communicate with others and/or access information. Therein lies the
fundamental problem: in economic terms, the Internet and its content are considered
“non-rivalrous and non-exclusionary” given that “[one] person‟s use of information,
unlike tangible goods and services, does not prohibit others from using it.” 152 For this
reason, media products have long posed problems for capitalist systems and have
historically required market interventions for them to operate within its framework.153
Keeping in step, intervention was required in order to introduce the Internet to the public
as a billable good within the free-market system.
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In order to commodify the Internet, service providers (ISPs) had to create scarcity
artificially, largely by controlling and charging for access. In the US, the giant
telecommunication corporations became the gatekeepers of the Internet by default
because they already had what amounts to government-issued monopoly licenses over
telephone and cable television wires. Fortuitously, the Internet became publicly available
at the very time that the government (responding to pressure from the powerful telecom
lobby) was easing regulations of the telecommunication industry. With such strong
commercial and political power behind them, U.S. telephone and cable television firms
established an Internet access industry that was (and remains) the antithesis of freemarket capitalism. In 2011, for instance, 78 percent of U.S. households had at most two
options for wired broadband access. This amounts to an effective duopoly; an
uncompetitive market form in which it is in both firms‟ self-interest to charge extremely
high prices and where neither firm has any real incentive to improve their service.154
This model is certainly not ideal, and other countries have adopted alternative,
and oftentimes more efficient, means of providing Internet access. In fact, it is worth
noting that the U.S. ranks between fifteen and twenty in terms of global broadband
access, quality of service, and cost.155 Such statistics help illustrate the difficulties in
aligning the Internet to market logic and cast doubts on the U.S.‟s position as the example
of how the Internet should be governed.
Beyond charging for access, private companies are further commercializing the
Internet via Internet-related industries (such as search engines, email, social media,
mobile applications, etc.), in many cases generating incredible market concentration.
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Many ICT companies are seizing enormous profits by establishing virtual monopolies
with global reach. Google, for example, commands between 70-90 percent of the global
search engine market and Apple‟s iTunes controls an estimated 87 percent of the digital
music market and 70 percent of the MP3 player market.156 Microsoft, Intel, Amazon,
Facebook and others enjoy similar monopolistic power in their respective markets as
well.157
Such examples run directly counter to the Connectivity Doctrine‟s projection of
the Internet as a free-market utopia and a facilitator of competition and consumer
empowerment.158 Moreover, by design, networked markets like the Internet actually
accelerate market concentration and encourage monopolies by a process called
“Metcalfe‟s law,” which states that the value of a network increases in proportion to the
square of its connections. Correspondingly, consumer attraction to a particular firm
increases by an order of magnitude as it gains an increased share of the market. This is
especially true for companies like Google and Facebook, whose service actually
improves with each new user. Such market tendencies make competition nearly
impossible as the largest companies quickly expand and drown out all competitors. 159
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Chapter VI: Connectivity, Violence, and Empire
In their influential book, Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri present a
definitively postmodern and theoretical notion of „Empire‟ to address the modern
political order of globalization. The motivations, goals, and characteristics of modern
Empire, as articulated by Hardt and Negri, are seemingly quite similar to those of the
Connectivity Doctrine. As such, a brief overview of their theory may prove helpful in
working through the Connectivity Doctrine‟s guiding logic.
Hardt and Negri contend that modern Empire honors no territorial limits and
instead seeks to rule over a spatial totality that constitutes the “civilized world.” Empire
also effectively “suspends history,” thereby removing all temporal boundaries that might
suggest a yet-to-be alternative. Borrowing Foucault‟s notion of biopower, Hardt and
Negri further argue that Empire not only manages populations and contructs the world in
which they live, but ultimately tries to rule over the social sphere in its entirety. Finally,
no matter how violent its actions may be, peace consistently remains at the center of
Empire‟s rhetoric.160
Despite similarities in the terms, this novel conception is significantly different
than the traditional understanding of imperialism, which they, in agreement with Eric
Hobsbawm, believe to be a project that has long since died and is no longer manageable
in the modern age. In the absence of the center-periphery power dichotomy on which
Western Imperialism was premised, modern power now flows through networks. As
such, in the present case, proponents of the Connectivity Doctrine strategically navigate
these power networks in an effort to influence the production, coding, ordering, and
dissemination of knowledge via ICT.
160
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In its present form, Empire is guided by a liberal, capitalist-based market logic;
thus its goals mirror those of the US and its allies. It is therefore understandable that
proponents of the Connectivity Doctrine have adopted many of the aforementioned
characteristics of Empire to advance their mutual aims. Likewise, the Doctrine‟s
adherent‟s employ epistemic violence as a means to systematically “suspend history,”
and “remove special and temporal boundaries” in order to “manage [virtual] populations
and construct the world in which they live.” Peace and tolerance remain central themes of
the Connectivity Doctrine‟s rhetoric, despite the epistemic violence that silences and
condemns alternative viewpoints.

6.1 Epistemic Violence
Such bold claims to authoritative knowledge like those presented in the
Connectivity Doctrine are examples of epistemic violence being carried out on
“subjugated knowledges” that are not analogous with hegemonic discourses. As Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak explains in her influential inquiry into the Western intellectual‟s role
in power relations, “Can the Subaltern Speak,” epistemic violence establishes a particular
explanation of reality as normative and uncontestable. In the process, it disqualifies
contradictory claims to knowledge as “inadequate to their task,” “insufficiently
elaborated,” “naïve,” or “beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity.”161 As
with other forms of imperial violence, epistemic violence is often justified as necessary to
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protect “the other” from her “own kind” and to establish “good society”162 in places held
back by inferior knowledges, norms, and values.
By situating their goals within a broader commitment to political and civil rights,
advocates of the Connectivity Doctrine advance a particular type of technology that
accords with a Western understanding of liberal-democratic norms and values.163 Such a
strategy is part of the larger goal of expanding liberal, democratic capitalism
internationally; “Internet freedom” is but one of many vehicles employed to advance this
goal.164 These norms and values, however, have contested political and economic aspects
that do not always coincide with the freedom rhetoric or the rights discourse.
For one example, while the US argues that everyone should in principle have
access to information, the ability to access that information is not guaranteed. Thus a
strictly political and liberal definition of equality is implied even when the benefits are
said to be universal.165 The US is thereby able to maintain its commitment to intellectual
property rights, whose profits would be threatened by the extension of substantive
equality of access, without explicitly discussing this point.166 In using the limited,
political definition of equality, the US is able to quietly weave liberal-economic values
into the human rights discourse without having to explicitly defend the merits of doing
so. Similar to “adding pork” to congressional legislation, this strategic method ensures
that the debate is kept to a minimum. Any challenge to the inclusion of these symbolic
values can be dismissed as an affront to human rights and thus unworthy of debate.
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Because the terms of the debate have been so effectively demarcated, the
questions that academics, NGOs, and international governing institutions ask often fall
neatly within the established perimeters. These inquiries typically involve how to close
the digital divide, how information technology can be used to improve economic
conditions, and how best to regulate information traffic flows. The debate is primarily
concerned with how ICT affects populations (in terms of its economic output, education,
democratic participation, etc); rarely does the debate include what impact connectivity
has on users as individuals.
Addressing this point, Julian Reid argues that the act of becoming connected
subjectifies peoples, constituting them as members of a group distinguished by the
properties of connectivity.167 “The Connected,” as a subset of people, are increasingly
understood to be more social, more competent, and more skilled, than “the
Disconnected.” Categorizing peoples in this way makes it easier to identify problems,
prescribe solutions and assess progress quantitatively. Viewed in this light, connectivity
appears as both the problem and its solution; because “the Connected” are simply “better
equipped to participate in modern society,”168 expanding this group becomes the main
objective of “responsible governments.”
The US‟s position on Internet freedom is premised on the arrogant supposition
that the US knows what is best for the whole of humanity169 and is therefore duty bound
to save the ill-informed from their own ignorance. Similarly, this logic implicitly suggests
that conflicting policies concerning ICT are based on knowledge that is “beneath the
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required level of cognition” and that run counter to the natural course of historical
progress and are thus “inadequate to their task.”170 Casting itself as the embodiment of
universal, normative values and claiming responsibility for network governance, the US
deploys epistemic violence to subjugate and silence alternative discourses and establish
the terms of the debate over global Internet practices. The assumption underlying the
free speech and human rights rhetoric in Clinton‟s speeches, and the Connectivity
Doctrine in general, is that free markets and Western-style democracy are universally
good. From this premise, the “problem” becomes how best to spread these values. The
“solution” is, accordingly, increased connectivity modeled on the US‟s preferred ICT
architecture. American officials and their allies effectively shut down alternative avenues
for argumentation; differing viewpoints are not merely cast as misconceived or
illegitimate, they are categorically dismissed as unworthy of even being considered for
debate.171

6.2 Physical Violence
Epistemic violence often paves the way for physical violence as states frequently
cite perceived security concerns or appeal to their preferred version of a Human Rights
Doctrine to justify foreign interventions. As Foucault explains, the success of the liberal
project has long depended on strategies that promote certain norms and practices within
governed populations which accord with the „biological destiny of the species.‟172 Those
who employ the “historical progress” argument to advance global ICT adoption via the
Connectivity Doctrine often subscribe to this type of logic.
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James Rosenau provides some of the requisite scholarly credibility to this line of
reasoning, arguing that connectivity is a natural, “evolutionary capacity of humanity” that
represents the culmination of five million years of a progressive process of learning.173
Employing this logic, those who remain “disconnected” are oftentimes marked as the
dangerous “other”; their rejection of techno-modernity is interpreted as either ignorance
or a threat to progress. Thus it becomes the task of the Liberal-Connected to either
convert the disconnected into believers of the Connectivity Doctrine or force them into
compliance. If their rejection is due to ignorance, than the disconnected “other” must
simply “be taught how to be connective.”174 As James Rosenau argues, “connective
habits and tendencies” must be meticulously constituted in a manner that “will subject
[the disconnected] to the lore of connectivity.” 175 The underlying assumption is that
once they see ICT‟s utility and promise, the disconnected subjects should become
amenable to connectivity. If they do not, the disconnected must either be coerced into
transforming or removed, “if necessary with violence, force and war.”176 Regardless of
the method, “disconnected peoples must be made into connected ones.”177
As the American military strategist Thomas Barnett opined: “Eradicating
disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral
cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will.”178 Defining connectivity as a
“security task” adds a military dimension to the issue that is not always addressed when
advocates use human rights rhetoric to advance global ICT proliferation. Like all security
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projects, this security project is a violent one.179 And the violence becomes even more
imminent when the global divide between the “„Functioning Core‟ of connected peoples”
and the “„Non-integrating Gap‟ of disconnected ones” is advanced as not merely a
technological disconnect, but as a direct threat to the “correct” way of life and the liberal
project at large.180 The rejection of ICT and the emancipatory Connectivity Doctrine,
whether by choice or from the lack of material capacities, is understood to be a
disconnect from the “rules that define the organization of life” and thus “demand[s]
attention from US military forces.”181
As such, it is likewise understandable that “the Connected” wage wars almost
exclusively on the “Disconnected”182 The severity of military action varies according to
the circumstance, but connectivity is regularly used in one way or another to justify most
contemporary acts of foreign intervention, and is almost always linked to human rights
and democracy.183 Technological interventions have become increasingly common in the
last few decades and often serve as a precursor to more aggressive forms of intervention
or at least set the stage for more physical forms of violence.184
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With such ties between technology and foreign intervention, it is understandable
that ICT has rapidly been integrated into a new canon of network-centric warfare.
Employing handheld computers and communication devices, CGI and satellite mapping
systems, and computer-guided weaponry, the “Connected” enjoy a far superior military
elite than the “Disconnected,” at least in terms of technological capabilities. Thus while
its proponents often praise the emancipatory potential ICT may have, “its emergence has
been as much tied to the exigencies of demands for improvement in the capacities for
war-making as it has for new systems of global governance.”185 Indeed, ICT and violence
often go hand in hand; many of the dominant information and communications
technologies (most famously the Internet) that are now available for public use were first
developed for the use of Western militaries. Now, these same militaries are helping
expand ICTs globally through their role in advancing the Connectivity Doctrine.

6.3 Technological Intervention and Violence
The US State Department has actively funded the development and promotion of
Internet censorship circumvention tools since at least 2001, allocating a reported $15
million to the effort in 2008186 and another $28 million in 2011.187 These figures may
seem relatively low for a US governmental line item, but they reflect the minimal cost
and labor required for this type of foreign intervention. With numerous institutions and
NGOs willing and able to develop, deploy, and provide training on how to use these
technologies, coupled with the international approval garnered from the diplomatic
185
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capital invested in the UN Human Rights Council and elsewhere, the US is able to
promote its policies at marginal cost.188 Still, while the monetary expense of
technological intervention may not be substantial, the objectives are far from
inconsequential. Despite the rhetoric, the US does not act solely out of concern for human
rights. Rather, its ultimate goal is to transform international political and economic
systems in a manner more sympathetic to its norms and values. As Daniel McCarthy
argues, “[t]he desired transformation is a physical one, an attempt to literally build the
international system in line with the American vision for global politics.”189
Even with broad international support for this type of technological intervention,
it should be noted that such policies are not legally sanctioned by international society.
These efforts are a form of direct intervention into the laws and policies of sovereign
states, designed specifically to simultaneously assist foreign nationals in breaking their
home country‟s laws and hinder the ability of foreign governments to enforce them.190
Moreover, such seemingly “mild” forms of intervention can have serious consequences
for individuals caught using US financed censorship circumvention technology or
attending US-sponsored training sessions.
One striking example of the potentially violent ramifications of technological
intervention emerged during the demonstrations in Iran following the contentious
presidential election in 2009. Wanting to help Iranians access websites that were banned
by the government, Austin Heap, a San Francisco based software developer created an

188

McCarthy 2011, 103.
McCarthy 2011, 104.
190
Ibid.
189

66

anonymizer191 called Haystack that pierced virtual firewalls192 while also creating the
illusion (to any third party monitoring Internet activity) that users were browsing
innocuous sites (like weather.com or official state media websites).
Haystack received overwhelmingly positive coverage from Western media; The
International Herald Tribune, NPR, Christian Science Monitor, BBC News, among
others,193 cast Austin Heap as a wunderkind in their reports and The Guardian even
declared him “innovator of the year” in March 2010 for his work.194 Yet Heap received
these accolades before anyone could verify that the software actually worked. No one
outside Heap‟s team, including reporters or security professionals, was allowed access to
Haystack‟s code. When asked to examine the program, Heap simply offered reassurance
of Haystack‟s functionality and warned that releasing a copy would undermine the
project‟s security.195 So confidant was Heap in Haystack‟s capabilities that he boasted in
Newsweek of his plan to export the program to other countries: “We will systematically
take on each repressive country that censors its people. We have a list. Don't piss off
hackers who will have their way with you. A mischievous kid will show you how the
Internet works."196
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Without independent verification or testing, Heap was simply taken at his word
and praised for his work. The US State Department went so far as to “fast-track”
Haystack through the necessary bureaucratic channels to ensure Heap would not be in
violation of the US trade embargo with Iran. That he received the necessary licenses and
clearance so quickly suggests that no one at the State Department examined the software
very closely. Still, the US government‟s endorsement of Haystack (Secretary Clinton
even mentioned the software by name during an interview), coupled with the positive
coverage in mainstream (Western) media outlets, gave the software an apparent seal of
approval that led many to believe that the software worked and could successfully shield
Iranians from government surveillance.
The problem is that Haystack did not live up to Heap‟s promises. After just a few
hours of reviewing a leaked copy of the software‟s code, third-party testers discovered
enormous problems with the program.197 Not only did the program fail to bypass Iran‟s
firewall, it also left virtual trails containing users‟ GPS coordinates that the Iranian
government could potentially use to identify anyone who ever used the software, even
years after the fact. 198
It is unclear how many Iranians used this particular software and very little is
known of any Haystack-related arrests in Iran.199 Still, based on its history of violent
dealings with anti-government demonstrators, it is not a far stretch to speculate that the
potential ramifications for Iranian citizens caught using Haystack would have been
severe. If indeed the Iranian state did use brute force to punish those who used this
particular software, or technology like it, the US is certainly culpable, if not wholly
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responsible for the violence. Likewise, the 26 year old software developer, the
international media, the UN, the numerous countries that supported this type of
technology, and countless others also share some burden of responsibility.
As evidenced by its response to the recent pro-democracy demonstrations
throughout the Middle East, as well as the speeches given by Secretary Clinton, the US is
showing no signs of curtailing its policy on technological interventions, nor any other
part of its Internet agenda, despite learning of the Haystack debacle. Quite the contrary,
the US and other proponents of the Connectivity Doctrine remain committed to the global
expansion of a “singular,” Western-based model of the Internet at all costs. Thus the
relevant question for this inquiry becomes, if it has not happened already, how long will
it be before this readily accepted, “mild” form of intervention results in physically violent
consequences?

6.4 US Foreign Policy and Violence
Through her speeches, Secretary Clinton meticulously presents the Connectivity
Doctrine as a benevolent gift to the world‟s “disconnected” populations. And she
preemptively defends the policy from attack by situating it within a globally respected
human rights discourse. Such tactics may be politically savvy, but they also serve to draw
attention away from the potentially violent repercussions of the Doctrine‟s associated
actions. Besides the aforementioned epistemic violence and the potentially violent
punishment for circumventing ICT censorship, violence can also be the consequence of
inconsistencies in the content and application of foreign policy that has been influenced
by the Connectivity Doctrine.
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Over the past few decades, philosophically realist theories of international
relations have guided much of U.S. foreign policy. As such, the U.S. has, on occasion,
supported regimes that they may not agree with ideologically, but that are, nonetheless, of
strategic importance at a given time. Recent instances, which are especially pertinent to
the present argument, include supporting authoritarian regimes financially, militarily, and
in official statements while at the same time providing financial backing and technical
support to opposition movements. For example, in the years leading up to the 2011
revolution, Egypt received nearly $1.4 billion annually in military aid from the U.S. (the
second highest recipient behind Israel) despite its authoritarian government and dismal
human rights record. At the same time, according to diplomatic cables obtained by
WikiLeaks,200 the U.S. was funneling tens of millions of dollars to pro-democracy
organizations in the country.201 Many members of these oppositional groups were
subjected to physical violence as a result of their involvement in anti-regime protests,
violence that was often carried out by Mubarek-led military that was in part funded by
US aid. The U.S., in effect, helped fund both sides of the conflict. In its official
statements, however, the Obama administration remained ambiguous; they refused to call
for President Mubarek‟s resignation and never seriously threatened to take away its
financial assistance.202
While exalting the emancipatory and democratic promises of ICT, and actively
funding its global proliferation, the US continues to provide diplomatic, financial, and
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military support to undemocratic and oppressive regimes. Many of these recipients of US
aid are amongst the worst in terms of Internet censorship and surveillance and have often
used violence to punish those caught using ICT to promote democratic movements. To
cite just a few examples besides Egypt, Vietnam, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, and several others were all labeled “enemies of the Internet” or “under
surveillance” by Reporters Without Borders,203 yet all received substantial foreign aid
packages from the US, in many cases funding specifically targeted for military
purposes.204
Such inconsistencies are obviously not included in official speeches, yet they are
nonetheless essential in understanding the Connectivity Doctrine. As a political devise,
the Doctrine may guide policy, when it is convenient to do so, but its application is
certainly not universal or evenhanded. Despite best intentions, the governments,
institutions, and corporations that support the Connectivity Doctrine have to measure
policy decisions in terms of their own self-interest. The techo-optimistic rhetoric that
claims otherwise is simply misleading and demands serious scrutiny, as the gaps between
promise and practice share troubling similarities with those created by past imperial
powers.
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6.5 Connectivity and Empire
Marx argues that a social formation (capitalism, communism, neoliberalism, etc.)
must reproduce the condition of its production to ensure its longevity. In the capitalist
system, this is accomplished by securing the conditions for capital accumulation through
the extension of capitalist logic and practices to new territories and commodities. 205 In
the era of early capitalism, imperialism ensured the necessary territorial expansion to
maintain its preferred social order. In the modern “Information Age,” the Connectivity
Doctrine is the vehicle of choice with which to secure the conditions of production within
the new knowledge-based economy.
Adding to Marx‟s assertion, Louis Althusser contends that “repressive and
ideological state apparatuses” are deployed in tandem to secure said reproduction of the
condition of production. These ideological apparatuses (church, school, consumerism,
etc.) facilitate the movement of capital by instilling the requisite principles and practices
in the minds of a population, while at the same time demystifying the “gruesome
consequences of capitalism.”206 The repressive apparatuses (military, police, etc.), in turn,
work to squelch any dissent that might threaten the state‟s desired ends. States have
adapted such apparatuses over time in response to changes in socio, political, and
economic demands.
Throughout history, imperial powers have continually employed technology and
manipulated knowledges as part of both of these processes. Doing so has served the dual
purpose of maintaining order while also allowing for the more efficient exploitation of
the population‟s labor force. As previously mentioned, in the Information Age, neo205
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liberalism has replaced the imperial state as the dominant hegemonic force. Powerful
states now work to secure new arenas for capital accumulation and to foster market
proliferation, rather than territorial expansion. While the goals of modern Empire have
changed, the means by which they are achieved remain consistent with those of its
imperial forebearers.
In the preface to his work on power and modernity, Colonizing Egypt, Timothy
Mitchell explains that 19th century imperialism involved far more than military
occupation and economic exploitation. Beyond establishing a ruling presence,
imperialism as a theoretical concept also refers to “the spread of a political order that
inscribes in the social world a new conception of space, new forms of personhood, and a
new means of manufacturing the experience of the real.”207 While Mitchell‟s analysis
focuses on Egypt, similarities exist between his analysis of British physical and mental
colonization in the 19th and 20th centuries and the modern “techno-imperialism” that is
occurring within the virtual space of the Internet. Likewise, parallels can further be drawn
between knowledge production and colonial “enframing” and the knowledge-ordering
processes currently taking place by Google and other technology giants.
Mitchell explains that colonizing forces aimed to “re-order” Egypt as something
“object-like” so it would appear as a world enframed.208 Egypt had to be reorganized and
recoded in a manner consistent with a European understanding of order, thus rendering it
available to political and economic calculation. In other words, “colonial power required
the country to become readable, like a book, in our own sense of such a term.” 209 The
result of such micro-level ordering of society was the production of what Mitchell calls
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the “world-as-exhibition,” in which a strict binary exists between the physical, material
reality and its representation, which is imbibed with meaning.
Colonial processes allowed for modern forms of “systematic yet unseen
surveillance”210 that further isolated and disciplined individuals in order to mold them
into modern political subjects. These new subjects were to conform to the new European
conception of personhood as something “set apart from a physical world…as the one who
observes and controls it…” The “true nature of the human person” was to be industrious,
self-disciplined, and “objective.” 211 Through surveillance, meticulous data collection,
and discipline, colonial forces applied European forms of knowledge to the colonized
populations so that they could come to “know” them. This “knowledge” was then to be
used to produce and codify a visible hierarchy, which enabled more consistent control
and efficient exploitation of the population and its labor power.212
The means by which information is ordered on the world wide web is strikingly
similar to the organizing techniques employed by colonial powers in their efforts to
restructure occupied lands into readable territories. While she does not explicitly draw
parallels between past and present imperial projects, Rita Raley does an excellent job of
explaining the modern “colonization of cyberspace” in her article, “eEmpires.” Raley
argues that the success of “eEmpire” is the result of the historic amalgamation of
technology and finance; a partnership that allows “eEmpire” to operate on a global scale
more efficiently than past forces ever achieved.213 This merger has effectively
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transcended the previous obstacles posed by time and space and has fundamentally
changed how capital and Empire operate.
As a networked operation, the strength of eEmpire lies in its flexibility and
growth potential; “its value increases as it grows, as [more] knowledge is accumulated,
more computers are linked to the system, and information processing becomes more
complex.”214 It does this in part because of the way the original architects of the Internet
inadvertently constructed the system. Every time someone accesses a Web page, the
user‟s computer participates in an “incessant dialogue” with other networked machines
during which it constantly transmits information such as the Internet Protocol (IP)
address, browser type, user domain, etc.215 In this manner, the Internet is able to “code”
each user and circulate their “reproductions” without their consent or knowledge,216
which in turn allows for vastly improved methods of “systematic yet unseen
surveillance,” for use by those with access to this data.
Differing from past empires that sought to extract raw materials and exploit cheap
labor from colonized lands, in the modern “information society,” individual users‟
personal information is the key exploitable commodity. This information is collected,
ordered, packaged and sold to marketing firms who in turn produce carefully targeted
advertisements to users. Such a model, based on the accumulation of virtual information,
allows global sales and marketing to penetrate geographical boundaries on an
unprecedented scale. Adding to this, multiple modes of consumption are increasingly
being synchronized into one platform, so that communication, buying, selling,
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entertainment, etc. all take place on a single computer, smart phone, or tablet, thus
allowing for progressively more efficient and precise means of data collection.
Striking as this may sound, such data collection does not necessarily result in a
virtual, “Big Brother-esque” panopticon on a global scale. Internet “cookies” only code
certain information, not all web activity. And while a tremendous amount of data is
collected, the majority is left unanalyzed. Still, the “digital traces” that users leave behind
produce extremely valuable information that can be coded and sold as a commodity,217
appropriated by governments for surveillance purposes, or used for any number of other
purposes.
Eric Schmidt, Chairman and CEO of Google, admits that his ultimate goal is to
acquire enough detailed personal information about each web user that Google “could
provide customized answers to the questions „what shall I do tomorrow?‟ and „what job
shall I take?‟”218 Admittedly, the possibility of instantaneous access to unlimited
information is as romantic as it is appealing. However, the potential remains for this
personal information to be used for more nefarious purposes. Furthermore, with such a
storehouse of data, some information must necessarily remain hidden, neglected, or
otherwise silenced. A hierarchy of knowledge is literally encoded in the means by which
information is ordered on the Internet and delivered via search engines. As such,
regardless of web developers‟ intentions, consolidating information and offering answers
in this manner demonstrates a contemporary form of epistemic violence.
Gayatri Spivak warns that knowledge of the Other will ultimately “cohere with
the work of imperialist subject-constitution, mingling epistemic violence with the
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advancement of learning and civilization.”219 Google‟s aggressive desire to accumulate
intimate details about every person on earth and to provide that information freely applies
directly to this warning. Google‟s algorithm is explicitly programmed to privilege and
deliver dominant discourses whenever a user enters a search term, thus all material drawn
from it reinforces the hegemonic power that supports the particular information or
positions presented. In this manner, the structure of Google and the architecture of the
Internet in general, serve to silence subordinate ideas and in doing so “consolidate an
inside” from which to draw profit.220
This association with epistemic violence is not meant to imply any moral
judgments concerning the CEO of Google or the company in general; however, there is
legitimate cause for concern over a corporation that warehouses such a vast collection of
data about private individuals. Such an arrogant desire to offer individualized answers to
personal questions submitted to an algorithm-based Internet query will absolutely
privilege certain epistemes at the expense of others, especially when the company‟s
ultimate goal is to generate profits. Furthermore, as some of the Google‟s top executives
enjoy positions alongside some of their counterparts from Facebook and other Internet
giants as advisors to the President of the United States on ICT policy, it seems imperative
to scrutinize such close relationships between the world sole remaining superpower and
the world‟s most powerful repositories and gatekeepers of knowledge.
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6.6 Selling Empire
There exists a striking similarity between 19th century imperialism and the
modern Connectivity Doctrine in the techniques employed to “sell” the two projects to
the affected populations. Immanuel Wallerstein explains in European Universalism that
hegemonic powers typically appeal to three primary varieties of universalism for
justification of their policies: defense of human rights and the spread of democracy;
western superiority [which is closely tied to posivistic notions of progress and
modernity]; and the inevitability of market neoliberalism.221 As reviewed in the previous
analysis of Secretary Clinton‟s speeches and US policy, these appeals to universalism are
repeated continuously in the Connectivity Doctrine to justify the proliferation of the
hegemonic model of ICT governance.
The Doctrine‟s active promotion of technology-fostered economic growth
represents a twenty-first century manifestation of the historically oft-used discourse of
“progress.” Prominent academics and economists provide the Doctrine with theoretical
justification and “legitimacy” by asserting that developing countries can “leapfrog”
industrial production and move directly from an agriculture-based economy to an
information-based economy by simply adopting the new technology-centric model of
progress.222 It is interesting to note here that the U.S. and other advocates of the
Connectivity Doctrine embraced this model of development at the very time that
resistance toward other “modernization” projects223 was gaining momentum.224 While the
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specifics of the projects may have changed, the overall goals and assumptions remained
largely the same.
Appealing to a sense of “Western superiority,” as in the past, modern hegemonic
power presents itself as the model of progress that others should emulate. In the present
case, the dominant “nodal powers”225 that promote the Connectivity Doctrine argue that
the widespread adoption of ICT (again, considered to be politically neutral tools) and
global adherence to the preferred (Western) structural, operational and governing norms
are essential for progress. Fittingly, such optimistic faith in the transformative potential of
ICT tends to mirror the Connectivity Doctrines‟s leading proponents‟ foundational
assumptions about the power of reason, rationality, and the scientific method to bring
about predictable and beneficial results. Arguing a similar point about development
agencies, Rafal Rohozinski argues: “when applied to the role of ICTs, these rational selfassumptions become even further reified by a pseudo-scientism that considers tools that
are themselves a product of scientific methods (as ICTs are) to necessarily be carriers of
rationality.”226
Understandably, telecommunications companies that stand to profit from the
widespread adoption of their technologies reaffirm the Connectivity Doctrine‟s basic
premises.227 Yet governments and international institutions also actively promote the
Connectivity Doctrine without questioning its intrinsic assumptions. The United Nations,
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the WTO, the IMF and many NGOs and academics tacitly accept the underlying neoliberal logic and look for ways to foster economic growth by adopting the framework of
the knowledge-based economy. Several UN reports even repeat the Doctrine‟s language,
urging developing nations to “catch the Internet Express” and argue that doing so is their
“best hope…for integrating into the global economy.”228 Recommendations and
development projects endorsed by the UN and other international political and economic
organizations strongly encourage global integration into the new knowledge-based
economy and implicitly support everything that comes with it, including strict intellectual
property laws, privatizing state-owned telecommunications networks, offering incentives
to and protecting new markets in ICT, etc. Promoting the Doctrine further, in 2000, UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan urged governments of developing countries to “nurture
and support” the private sector by providing institutional support, offering tax incentives,
and other measures. Such “other measures” of support include selling off domestic
telecommunication networks to foreign corporations, as was done by Estonia in the
1990s, a country that the UN lists as a model of successful integration into the global
knowledge-based economy.229
The Connectivity Doctrine helps illustrate the way power operates in the modern
networked society. Foucault argues that modern power must be analyzed as “something
that circulates…[because] Power is exercised through networks…[and] passes through
individuals. It is not applied to them.”230 Similarly, Empire works through individuals by
their own participation within said networks. Modern Empire, operating through
networks and facilitated by the Internet, does not seek to extend its fixed, territorial
228
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boundary but rather to “incorporate the entire global realm within its open, expanding
frontiers.”231
Such rapid and expansive incorporation can be detrimental to an individual‟s
understanding of identity. As states no longer serve as the singular “locus of power,”
they, consequently, no longer provide an adequate mythology that can bind a diverse
population.232 This failure is inconsequential for modern Empire, which is not interested
in preserving past unities that present potential barriers to capital expansion. Instead,
individuals linked to the networks forge new “hybrid identities” that are no longer rigidly
defined by a First World – Third World split, but rather, “a body so fragmented that its
morphology is a diaspora.”233 Nodal centers (such as global media conglomerates,
transnational corporations, and the ICT industry) battle for control of the “dominant
cultural memory” by “develop[ing] competing archives to store and produce the „truth‟ or
a dominant cultural memory.”234 Individuals engage with these networks constantly yet
remain “unconscious of the mechanisms that structure the [position] in which they find
themselves;”235 they remain “focused on the content [of networks], not on their mechanic
or formal qualities.”236
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun provides an analysis of one company‟s attempt to
(literally) “sell” modern ICT using the Connectivity Doctrine‟s guiding logic, and its
effect on individual identity, in her work on modern forms of power in the Information
Age. In the mid to late 1990s, when the Internet was still a novel technology for most
231
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people, private Internet service providers spent millions in advertising campaigns aimed
at convincing consumers to become connected. During this time, telecommunications
giant MCI ran a now-infamous commercial titled “Anthem” that presented the Internet as
a virtual, utopian realm of endless possibility, free from "real world" inequities like race,
class, gender, age, illness, etc. The advertisement features people of various races,
genders, ages and with physical challenges who recite the following script:

People can communicate mind-to-mind
Not black-to-white.
There is no race.
There are no genders.
Not man-to-woman
There is no age.
Not young-to-old
No age.
There are no infirmities.
Not short-to-tall.
Just thought-to-thought. Idea-to-idea.
There are only minds.
What is this place?
Utopia?
No.
The Internet,
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Where minds, doors and lives open up.
Nice place, this place called the Internet.
Is this a great time, or what?237

While the advertisement states that the Internet is not utopia, the overriding sentiment
implies it is like utopia. The commercial presents a virtual world that is seemingly
superior to the “real world;” a world devoid of inequality where the normative merits of
Enlightenment philosophy prevail. It insinuates that users can “resist objectification
(become emancipated) by becoming text online.”238 While users suffer from inequality in
the real world, the users‟ textual, virtual self-representations allow them to feel
empowered in their ability to “pass as the (fictional) unmarked white male” and “buy
oneself back into the realm of rational-critical debate, [the realm] which is now redefined
as the marketplace of ideas.”239 Marketing the myth that Internet users are all regarded as
equal and (race, class, gender) neutral “minds” in cyberspace depoliticizes the individual;
rather than addressing political, economic and social inequality, ISPs claim to simply
offer a place where they do not exist. The unspoken argument thus becomes: with such an
incredible opportunity, why would anyone NOT want to become part of the Connected?
Marketing the Internet in this way was extremely successful240 as the number of
US Internet users doubled from 1997 to 1998.241 While seemingly obvious, it is important
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to note that MCI was a private corporation selling a product for profit, it was not an
altruistic organization seeking to erase inequality and empower human beings, despite
what the ads might imply. MCI and other telecommunications firms actively exploited
and fostered a growing historical amnesia by implicitly asking users to disregard the real
discrimination they faced. Telecommunications corporations were in effect privatizing
civil rights and offering consumers the “rights” and “freedoms” that states had failed to
honor and protect for them as citizens.242
Ironically, the same year the MCI ad ran, a U.S. government report revealed that
the digital divide between white and minority households remained enormous. Yet rather
than hurting business, telecommunications companies were able to exploit these statistics
by asserting that the only solution to the disparity between “potential and actual
empowerment” via technology was for more users to purchase their products and
services. They effectively gave themselves an “unending mandate” by defining
“technologically produced…equality as the ideal,” which could only be reached on a
global scale only by increased adoption of their technology.243
While the Internet no longer needs to be “sold” to consumers as it did in the
1990s, ICT corporations continue to market the Internet as a utopian realm devoid of the
problems and inequities faced in the “real world.” In 2011, Google ran a television
commercial featuring the pop star Lady Gaga as part of the marketing campaign
promoting its web browser, Chrome. The commercial alternates between images of the
singer running through New York City and videos that Lady Gaga fans have posted on
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YouTube (a subsidiary of Google) of them singing along with and dancing to her music.
In the background, Lady Gaga‟s song “Edge of Glory” proclaims “there a‟int no reason
you and I should be alone…I‟m on the edge of glory, and I‟m hanging on a moment with
you.” The singer is then seen typing a message to her fans, telling them that they are all
“superstars” and that they inspire her. Lady Gaga concludes her message with a brief, yet
comforting sentiment: “This is our moment…Stay strong…” As the image fades,
Chrome‟s tagline appears on the screen: “the web is what you make of it.”244
The ad confronts a sense of isolation and loneliness that is common amongst Lady
Gaga fans, or “little monsters,” as she adoringly calls them.245 Google presents the
audience with a “virtual” community where everyone is welcome and where celebrity
and fan stand as equals; fans can both be inspired by and inspire their pop heroes and pop
stars can communicate directly with their audience. The music serves as an object of
commonality that brings together people from all walks of life; the Internet serves as the
vehicle that allows this to happen.
Twenty years after MCI ran the “Anthem” commercial, private companies are still
trying to package and sell the Internet as a utopian sphere, apart from the “real word.”
Like the MCI ad, the Chrome commercial presents a world of equality, freedom, and
endless possibility assessable solely through the use of ICT, particularly in this case,
Google products. In this way, telecommunications corporations have helped define, and
continue to shape, the parameters of debates concerning ICT and cyberspace. In
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advancing the Connectivity Doctrine, governmental bodies, NGOs, and private
companies present “cyberspace” as an existing, utopian realm, an improved alternative to
the “real world.” In so doing, they effectively depoliticize individual agency and existing
inequalities; users need not spend time negotiating identity or fighting for justice, for the
Connected are all equal in the network.
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Chapter VII: Conclusion
The purpose of this analysis is not to argue for or against global ICT proliferation,
nor is it to measure the merits of unfettered access to information against the sovereign
right to determine what content should or should not be made available for public
consumption. Rather, the purpose of this inquiry is to illustrate how epistemic violence
often renders such debate irrelevant. Through calculated rhetoric and strategic framing of
policy, the creative navigation of diplomatic channels, and by taking advantage of
influential positions in global institutions and governing bodies, proponents of the
Connectivity Doctrine have advanced a one-size-fits-all vision of the Internet as just,
moral, and progressive. In so doing, they have effectively sidelined debates concerning
the contingent history, optimal architecture, and present and future governance structure
of information and communication technology.246 Through the Connectivity Doctrine,
proponents have advanced a Western understanding of individual rights and liberal
sovereignty as superior to notions of cultural or communal rights. Likewise, Western (or
in this case, distinctly U.S.) definitions of free speech and intellectual property rights are
presented as universal rights and norms that trump a state‟s right to determine what is
best for its own security and economic well being.
This paper serves as a contribution to what I feel is an all too often neglected, yet
incredibly important aspect of ICT analyses. While I agree with Robert McChesney‟s
contention that modern ICT present “an unprecedented opportunity…to build a
communication system that will be a powerful impetus to a dramatically more egalitarian,
humane, sustainable, and creative society,”247 I believe that such a system can only

246
247

McCarthy 2011, 89.
McChesney 2007, xiii.

87

succeed if it is built on a solid foundation that embraces and fosters these end goals. If a
new global communication system is quickly forced into the existing framework without
the necessary debate and planning simply to replace the old, it risks becoming nothing
more than “Status Quo 2.0.” If the end goals of the Connectivity Doctrine are truly
freedom of speech, universal access to information, and democratic debate and dialogue
(as the rhetoric suggests), than these principles must guide the entire process.
I fear this “unprecedented opportunity” could be squandered if policy makers, and
those who influence them, become too enamored by the easy answers and romantic
promises of the Connectivity Doctrine. The Connectivity Doctrine‟s leading proponents
are Western governments, institutions, and corporations, who are all driven by motives
beyond human rights and free speech. By forcibly inserting neoliberal values into the
policies that shape the global ICT infrastructure (for example, promoting the privatization
of ICT-related companies and the deregulation of the ICT industry), the Doctrine‟s
advocates appear disingenuous; the policy simply does not match the rhetoric. The
prevailing models and policies concerning ICT architecture and governance are all well
suited for expanding neoliberalism abroad, but the same cannot be said for promoting
free speech and universal access to information.
This disconnect between the purported goals and benefits of the Connectivity
Doctrine and its actual implementation illustrates the need for further scrutiny of existing
and future policies that effect global ICT. Whether or not the Connectivity Doctrine
represents a modern form of virtual imperialism or not, serious consideration should be
given to the costs and benefits associated with applying policies that have such profound
implications. In the present case, the question must be asked: would the universal
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application of the Connectivity Doctrine (a singular, Western model of ICT adoption and
governance) do more harm than good to the people it is supposed to help?
Such an inquiry is extremely important and the answer has broad reaching and
long lasting consequences. Still, this topic is rarely addressed as such. Contemporary
debates in academia and international governing bodies about ICT and cyberspace are
concerned primarily with issues such as how to diminish the digital divide, how to protect
sensitive users from explicit material, how to prevent identity theft, how to combat online
piracy and protect intellectual property, etc. The Internet‟s architecture, organizational
structure, and governance are not debated nearly as much and are often assumed to be
fixed, neutral, or secondary concerns. As such, ICT debates are almost always premised
on the Connectivity Doctrine‟s broad assumptions: that a singular Internet exists; that the
dominant Internet structure and governing norms are universally applicable; and that
increased access to this specific version of the Internet is universally beneficial.
Ultimately, my personal opinion is that the Internet‟s architecture should reflect
the 1990s notion of the “information super highway,” and its content should be free and
accessible to all. Because information and communication is such a vital and fundamental
component of any functioning democracy, and because digital infrastructures are
relatively inexpensive to build and maintain, it seems reasonable that the Internet should
be universally available, free of charge, as a public service. Obviously this would require
substantial planning and costs initially in terms of infrastructure construction, education,
and other logistical demands, but this is no different than the publicly funded highway
system or the National Parks in terms of long-term costs and benefits. This is not to say
that the government should provide every citizen with a computer or any other device
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with which to connect to the Internet (although I would argue for increased access points
via libraries and other public institutions), but access to the World Wide Web should be
free and readily available; it should not be guarded and administered by private
corporations whose actions are unabashedly guided by profits over people.
In terms of content, I think the Internet should resemble a public library, where
people are not charged for access, but are instead provided information and resources free
of charge, regardless of race, class, or social status. The fundamental differences between
physical commodities and digital productions demand a reexamination of the existing
intellectual property laws. Likewise, the conveniently ambiguous approval of
“legitimate” censorship in the name of security, which I believe should be categorically
dismissed as an abuse of state power, merits substantial public debate.
While I strongly believe in a truly free and open Internet, I recognize that my
opinion is absolutely influenced by my residence within the United States and my
association with a Western, private, liberal arts university. Using the same logic that I
employ in this thesis to question the legitimacy of the US and its allies to prescribe the
global adoption of the Connectivity Doctrine, I admit that I am in no way qualified to
suggest an alternative ICT policy that is universally appropriate. ICT policy should be
crafted in a manner that respects religious and cultural values as well as political and
economic needs. It should not be used as a “carrot” or a “stick” to influence or punish
those with political and economic systems that differ from the hegemonic model. Such a
task will certainly be difficult and will require extensive debate and cooperation on a
global scale. Still, it is essential that policy makers put forth the necessary time, energy,
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and resources if we are ever to enjoy a communication system that will indeed foster a
“dramatically more egalitarian, humane, sustainable, and creative society,”248
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